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I. I NTRODUCTION 
A. P URPOS E OF THESI S 
Th e purpose of t hi s thes i s is t o e v a luat e t h e effects o f 
command, Control , Communicat ions , Compute rs and Inte ll igenc e 
(C' ! ) on Carr i er Battle Group (CV8G) o p e r a ti o ns . During t he 
las t few years a g reat d e a l of emphasis h a s been pl a c e d on 
i mp r ovi ng the mili tary's C'! capabi l ity. The Gl o bal Command 
and cont r o l System (GCeS), Co pernicus and C' I f or the Wa r rior 
a re a l l i ni t iatives des i g ned t o increa se the mi li t a r y's 
a bil i ty to tra ns f e r, proc e ss and uti li ze t he vast amounts of 
str a tegic and t actical data gathered during the p l a n n i ng a nd 
ex ecut i on of mil i tary oper ations . As resourc es f o r the des i gn 
and procure ment of mili t a r y f orces decline, the impor t a nce of 
ach ieving the " most bang f o r t h e buc k " b e COliles critical. An 
effec tive C' I sys t em g i ves t h e commander t h e abili t y t o t ailor 
his force s a nd deliver t he maximum striki ng powe r avai l a ble 
while mi n i mi zi ng the t hreat t o his own f o rces. 
8. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Wh a t i s t he e ffect i v e i mprovement o r degradat ion, if any , 
t o t h e stri king capabi 1 i t y o f the ba t t le gro u p if c' r i s 
i mpro v e d? 
Wha t i s the e ffective improvement or degrada tion to the 
d e f ens i v e c apabi l ity of the bat t le g r o u p if c' r is 
impr oved? 
How effective is C'I as a Battle Group Force Multiplier in 
a Littoral Environment? 
C. ME'I'HoooLQGY 
The Research Eva l uat i on System Analysis (RESA) wargame was 
utilized to conduct qualitative and quantitative analyses on 
the impact of Command, Control and Intelligence on the ability 
of a CVBG to conduct offensive air strike operations while 
maintaining effective defens i ve posture. Players 
participated in a tactical decision-making process during a 
simulated potential conflict involving North Korea. Each 
scenario required the player to command both air and surface 
naval forces during an air-strike mission conducted on a North 
Korean nuclear power facility. Additionally, an appropriate 
defensive posture was required to protect the CVBG against 
North Korean retaliation. Communications and Computers were 
not addressed due to the inability to effectively incorporate 
changes in these parameters in the RESA wargame. Command and 
Control data were gathered from interviews with wargame 
participants concerning their actions during simUlation play. 
These interviews provided the basis for the qualitative 
assessment as well as some of the quantitative information. 
Intelligence information was provided to the participants 
prior to and during their simulation run. This information 
was utiliZed to formulate an offensive and defensive strategy, 
as well as provide updates about enemy forces and intentions 
throughout the wargame . variat ions in the r e solution of 
intelligence i nformation permi tted obs erv a t ion of thei r 
ef fects on planning a nd exec u t ion o f mi li tary o pe rat ions. 
Data c ollected i n thi s a r e a primar ily consisted o f airc r aft 
att r i t i ons and the a mo unt o f ordnance placed on target . The 
simul at ions p r ovi d e d a c ontro l led environment as wel l a s the 
quantitative d a ta n e c essa r y f or a n in-dept h a nal ysis. 
D. SCOPE 
This thesis f ocuses on CVBG operat i ons i n a l ittoral 
environment. The primary e mphasis is centered around strike 
p l ann ing and execution as well as ma i ntain ing an e f fect i ve 
anti-air wa rf a re ( MW ) posture . In add ition , anti-surface 
wa r f a r e (ASUW ) played a n i mportant rol e ; however, a nti-
submarine warfare (ASW) was not cons idered . 
II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY 
A. RELEVANCE OF C'I TO WARFIGHTING 
Command is a function that arranges and coordinates 
everything that an organization or military force needs to 
perform its assigned mission. (Van Creveld, 1985, p6) Command 
responsibilities are directly proportional to the force's 
complexity and sophistication. The three major elements of a 
command system are organizations, procedures and technical 
(Van Creveld, 1985, plO) Control is the means by 
which command functions are executed. It is the application, 
managing and administration of the command elements in a 
coordinated effort to accomplish a mission. Although it is 
possible to have command without control, the converse is not 
necessarily true. Ef fecti ve management and leadership 
requires the integration of command and control. Command and 
control is thus a complex process of data collection, analysis 
and decision making skills utilized by an individual or group 
of people when a decision must be made and executed. 
Communications consist of the method of data transfer 
between different groups. This can be something as simple as 
a verbal exchange or can be as complex as an intricate 
satellite cOmJIlunications network. communications incorporate 
the flow of information necessary to accomplish a task. 
Computers have g reatly increased the a mount o f data t hat 
c a n be col lected and p r ocessed . Additionally, computers p lay 
an i mportant role i n the transfer of da t a and t hus have a 
signi ficant impact on communication s ys tems. I n fact, the 
impo r tance of computers is f el t throughout the entire C'I 
spect rum. 
Intelligence informa tion ha s a l ways p l ayed a key r o l e in 
determ in ing an adversary's intention. Intelligence is the 
total collection of information relevant to effective c ombat 
s ystem emp l oyment during the on-going, evolving o r ul timate l y 
planned operation or as o therwi se used in the fu lfillment o f 
comma nd/mi ssion ob jective . (Al phatech, 1994, p1) 
1. Historical Framework 
The pa rameters affec ting C'I are t he same today as 
t hey were c entur i es ago. Co mmanders hav e always s o ught t o 
g a in as much in telligence a bout their adversary 's intention as 
pos s i ble. Spies and diplomats have always been a valuable 
source of inf ormation a nd have been util i zed successful ly 
t hroug hout h istory . Prio r to 1800 the addi tional SOureElS o f 
intell ige nc e availab le i ncluded books and maps f rom which a 
c o mma nder coul d si ft informa t ion concerning the in tended 
t h e a t er o f operations, terra in features, c lima t e , e nemy 
composit i on and disposi tion. (Van Creveld , 1985, p19) 
commun ica t ion functions had a ma jor i nfl uence on the 
commander' s ability to contro l his f orce ( s ) . Perha ps the most 
important factor was the amount of time required to pass 
information from sender to receiver through a human courier. 
The time required was a function of distance and thus the 
greater the distance the less up-to-date the information was. 
The telegraph was the first substantial advance in 
communications; however, dependent upon wires and fixed 
transmitting/relaying stations, their usefulness was more 
suited to defensive roles and strategic, administrative a nd 
logistic communications. (Van Creveld, 1985, pl07 ) However, 
due to the telegraph's vulnerability and unreliability, 
tactical communication was transmitted via couriers in the 
traditional way. (Van Creveld, 1985, pl0) 
computing systems were comprised of human tabulators 
responsible for compiling, analyzing and reporting on the 
information obtained. Napoleon created the statistical Bureau 
which obtained long-range strategic enemy intelligence, 
analyzed the data and reported the results to military planner 
(Van Creveld, 1985, p66) Al though these "human computers" 
performed a vi tal function, they were I imi ted in the amount of 
data they could analyze and were prone to errors. 
Command and control functions were greatly influenced 
by the sophistication of intelligence, communications and 
"computing capabilities." The ability to effectively control 
a mil itary force restricted its size and disposition. 
Logistics rather than strat.egy often forced comma nders to 
divide their forces into smaller, more manageable units. 
Terrain and supporting i nfr astructures often placed limi ts on 
the amount of men and equi pment that a given are a could 
support (Van Creveld , 1985, p25) As late as the eighteenth 
century no European a rmy h a d a p e rmanent forma t ion l a rger than 
2,250 men. (Van Creveld, 1985, p 24 ) 
The a ncient Roman s r e cognized this "command and 
c ontrol" pre dicame nt and devised the legio n as a means to 
so l ve the problem. Th e legion was an admi nistr ative uni t, not 
a tactica l one ; subordinate uni ts c a rried out tactic al 
movements because they were b e tter able t o control the f o rces 
under their comma nd. (Van c reveld, 1985, p46 ) Centuri es 
later, this concept wa s a pplied by Napoleon as he divided his 
a rmy into s ma l ler, more man a geable , and thu s more ef fective, 
divisions and corps. ( Van Creve l d, 1985, p72) 
2. Pres ent 
Modern d ay inte llige nce col l ectio n methods incorporate 
a wide variety of technique s. Although d iplomats and spies 
still provide valuable information, comple x e lectronic devices 
have made it possible to e xpl oit the electromagnet ic spectrum 
to gather i magery, communicatio n and signal data about a n 
adversary. 
Communication methods have also e volved dramat ically. 
Once de pendent u pon the courier for re lia b le informatio n 
t ransfer , new methods such as r ad io frequency (RF), mic rowave , 
f iber optics and satellite communications have made it 
possible to send vast amounts of information in a fraction of 
the time. Commanders at all levels can communicate with other 
members virtually at wil l . 
Computer technology has advanced so rapidly that it is 
possible to process and analyze such a large amount of data 
that information overload becomes a se r ious concern. Errors 
are almost non-existent and there is virtually no limit to the 
amount of information that can be processed. 
The command and control issues facing the commander 
t oday are much more complex than they we r e historically. 
There are now more types of intel l igence gathering devices and 
more communication methods available that the commander must 
effectively manage and utilize. Each new generation of 
equipment and technology tends to be more complex than the one 
it replaced, and consequently the logistiC, administrative and 
operating requ i rements become more complicated. ( Van Creveld, 
1985, p234) Specialization has become more common and is an 
accepted way to ensure that new technologies are adequately 
managed. Centralization of command and control functions is 
also sometimes applied in an attempt to ensure effective 
control of mi litary forces. 
3. Future 
Future command and control systems will undoubtably be 
even more sophisticated as they wi ll surely have to be able to 
manage an ever increasing array of intelligence gather i ng 
devices, commun i cation netwo rks and compute r systems. Data 
fusion t e chniques a re cur rentl y being developed to provide the 
commander with the ability t o a ccess intellige nce data b a ses 
thr oug h v a r i ous types o f commun ication systems. The C'! for 
the Warrior init i a t i ve is designed to p r o vide a fused real 
time , true repr ese nt a tion of the warrior ' s bat tl e space. (C' ! 
FTW, 199J , p 4 ) Th e Copernicus system is des i g ne d to provid e 
the use r with the abil ity to input data ( push) into the system 
a n d re trieve ( pull ) i n f o rmat ion f rom the system relevant to 
h is situation. Th is a rchitec ture uti lizes a la rge data base 
o f in f o rmation that is avai l able to a mult itude o f users. The 
info rma t ion a vailab le for (pulling) is subje ct to s ecuri ty 
proced ures, t hus c on trol ling informati o n wi t hin est ablishe d 
s ecuri ty requ i rements . 
Artif i cial i nte lligence development, mul t i level 
s e curity s yst e ms a nd dat a compression and transmiss ion 
techniques a ll wi ll have a n i mpact on future C' ! syst ems. The 
successful i ntegration of intelligence collec t ion, 
communication device s and computing s ystems i nto an 
arch i t e c t ure t hat wil l al low a commande r to effectively 
c o mmand and control his force will certainly be a chal lenge. 
DE'TERMININC C' I REQUIREMENTS 
De termi n ing C'! requirements is accomplished by assessi ng 
the c u rrent and desi r ed warf i ght ing c a pabilities o f t he 
milit a ry f orce. Deficiencies a re noted a nd various 
alternative solutions are identified for consideration. A 
qualitative and quantitative appraisal is performed 
alternative solutions so that the best solution may be 
identified to correct the deficiency. 
1. Warfighting Assessment 
Assessing the warfighting capabilities and requisites 
of a military force requires a thorough examination of the 
intended areas of operation. The area( s) of intended 
operation greatly influence C'! system development and 
implementation. Once identified, C'! system requirements can 
be recognized and procured wi thin existing constraints. 
a. Scenarios of Intended operations 
The geographic location in which a military 
organization is intended to operate and the mission it is 
assigned to perform has a significant effect on how the force 
i s composed and supported. For example, a CVBG conducting 
strike operations against land targets while maintaining an 
effective defense against retaliatory air strikes has 
different concerns than an ASW task. force assigned to patrol 
and track. all unknown submarine contacts. The C'! system that 
supports the organization must enable the task. force to 
perform i ts mission to the utmost of its ability so that it 
can maximize its offensive and defensive potential. 
Historically. naval forces were required to ensure 
that the "Sea Lanes of Communication" were free of obstruction 
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so that United states a nd a llied forces could "project the i r 
power" a nywhere in the world. Typical l y , th is strategy was 
centered around t he des i r e t o contai n Soviet and communi s t 
expansion on a globa l sca l e . With the col l apse of the Soviet 
Union and t h e fal l of communis t regimes in eastern Europe, 
U. S. national strategy ha s shif ted from a f ocus on a g lobal 
threat to a f ocus on reg i onal c hallenges. ( From the Sea, 199 2, 
pl) Al though the focus has been rede f i ned , American force s 
will s till be called upon to accomplish tradi t ional missions 
of stra t egic deterrence , contro l of the seas, ext ended a nd 
continuous on-scene crisis res ponse, power projection a nd 
large scale s ealift. ( From the Sea, 1992, pl ) 
Littoral environment campaigns appear to encompass 
the majori ty of future mi litary operations. Whet her the 
mission is s upport f or a h umanitarian rel ief effort o ff the 
coast of Somalia, counter-narcotic o perat ions in t he Caribbean 
Se a o r extensive s trike operations conducted i n s upport of a 
"Desert Storm" style c onfl ict, U.S. naval f orces will be 
o perating in a l ittoral environment. Consequently, C' l 
systems must be optimized for t hese types o f o perat i o ns . 
b . Constraint s 
Un f o r tunately there are many constrai nts that 
hinder the development, p rocurement a nd instal lat ion o f 
effectiVe C'! systems. Some of these c onstraints inc lud e 
technology, funding, force levels and composit i on, time and 
national military strategies. 
Technological constraints include the limitations 
of current systems. Communication networks and computer 
systems are limited by weight and the capacity of information 
they can handle. Intelligence gathering methods are limited 
by the resolution of sensors and amount of information that 
can effectively be collected. 
Fiscal constraints perhaps have the most 
significant effect on C'l systems. Although a system may meet 
the need of a military force, the cost of the system may 
preclude its procurement. Another factor is that military 
effectiveness is often measured in easily quantifiable terms. 
Attrit ion rates, amount of ordnance placed on target and 
delivery rates all provide excellent ways to compare systems: 
however, C'I systems are not easi l y quantifiable and thus can 
suffer from funding cuts unless they can clearly demonstrate 
their usefulness. 
The large variety of mil itary forces and their 
composition affect the design and usage of C'I systems. 
system must be interoperable. Every unit within the entire 
force must be integrated into the system and be able to 
effectively utilize the system. The diversity, complexity and 
specialization of military units create additional problems 
for successful implementation of C'I systems. 
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Time imposes additio nal constraint s because in 
many situations C' l s ystems must be deployed as soon 
possibl e , a nd a dequate d e ve lopment l ead time may not b e 
available . Thi s sometimes leads to a "quick fix" solution, 
and s ubsequently a more c apable system is never developed. 
As na t ional mi li t a ry stra teg i es are redefined in 
response to the c ha nging global environment, C'l systems must 
adapt to a ccommod a te the c hanging demands. This constraint 
o f ten r equ i res s ystems to be specialized enough to comply 
with current strategy demands, yet general enough to adjust to 
evolv i n g s trate g i es. 
2. Qualitat ive Appraisal 
Qua litative appraisals permit the evaluator to assess 
a s y s t em and de t erm i ne t he benef i ts and 1 imi tat ions in a 
subject i ve man ner. Al though this typ e o f survey does not 
ge ne rally i ncorporate an o bject ive analys i s , i t provides a 
method t o eva luate a system. 
Benefits 
Analyses o f this nature have the benefit of n o t 
being dependent upon a statist ical analys i s. The evaluat ion 
of ten conside rs numerous intangible f ea ture s t hat may not be 
quant ifiab l e. In many i n s tanc e s where hUman int eraction is 
invol ved, this type o f appraisal is required to some degree. 
I t is very d i fficult, if not impossible, to quantify all 
imp o r tant h uman dec i s ion-making characteristics . 
b. Liaitations 
The l imitations of the qualitative eva l uation 
inc l ude excessive reliance on human judgment in the absence of 
sound statistical observations. A quant i tative, stat i stical 
analysis precisely measures the correlations and differences 
between important variab l es, highl ights obser ved trends and 
provides a solid anchor for decisions to be made. 
J. Quantitative Appraisal 
Quanti tati ve appraisals permit the evaluator to assess 
a system and determine the benefits and limitations in an 
Objective manner. This type of survey genera l ly incorporates 
a statistical analysis. It provides a method to eva l uate a 
system without introducing hUman biases which cou l d taint the 
analysis and undermine effective decision making. 
Modeling 
Quantitative ana l yses often re l y on models as the 
primary mechanism for conducting the analysis. A model is a 
simp l ified representation of the entity it im i tates or 
simulates. (Hughes, 1984, pI) Ana l ytic models are typically 
either simul ations or wargames. Both may uti l ize computer 
resources to expedite data col l ection and analysis. The 
primary difference between simulations and wargames i s that 
simUlations are genera l ly systemic . Human decision making is 
represented by preprogrammed algo r ithms which may be defined 
probabi listically. (Hughes, 1984, p42) Parameters are set 
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before t he simu l a tion begi n s or the simulat i o n may b e sto pped 
to accept hUman inputs . This type of mode l has the benef i t of 
ensur ing that huma n b iases and judgements a r e not introduced 
into t h e mode l; therefore , t h e results a re a t rue reflection 
of the var i a bles a nd their i nt e ract i ons in the mode l. 
Wa rgames, on the other hand, incorporate hUman 
intera c tions into the model. Human p a rt icipants a r e a n 
integral part of the wargame model, and the variances they 
introduce are considered c rucial and an important element i n 
the model. Since t he g oa l of th is thesis i s to evaluate the 
effects of Command , Contr ol and I ntelligence, the mo st 
appr opri a te mode l is the wargame because i t incorporates the 
huma n factor . 
Models can b e class ified as eithe r high resolut ion 
low resolution. In a h igh r esolution model, a d e tai l ed 
v i ew i s achieved by represent ing i ndiv i d ual combatants as 
s epara te enti t ies. {Hartman , 1992, pI} A low reso l ution 
mod e l, on t he other hand, combines uni ts of smaller size into 
a l arger , more managable entity ; however, thi s aggregation 
sac r ifices model d e tai l. For example, in a high reso l ut ion 
model the total rema i ning ordn a nce load of an aircraft s t r ike 
group may be tra cked by ind i vidual aircraft ; h owe ver, in t he 
aggregated ( l ow resolution ) model this may be tracked by a n 
ave rage a mo unt o f ordna nce r emaining in the e ntire f ormat i on. 
The model wou l d not care that some ai r c r af t were n e arly o u t o f 
ordnance wh ile o the rs may have a f ull l o a d. {Hart man, 199 2, 
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p3 1 Aggregated models also do not track information 
concerning event sequencing because they do not keep a record 
of individual actions. (Hartman, 1992, pJ) 
b. Hodel Deteraination 
The two wargames that were available for use at 
the Naval PostGraduate School were the Joint Theater Level 
Simul ations (JTLS) and the Research Evaluation Systems 
Analysis (RESAl. Both simUlations support human players; 
however, there are substantial differences between the two. 
( 1) Joint Theater Level Simulation (JTLS). JTLS 
is a stochastic, real time player interactive simulation of 
joint theater combat. (Hartman, 1992, p6) since the basic 
uni t in JTLS is a division or naval task force, it is an 
aggregated, low resolution model. The JTLS simulation 
requires a great deal of operator familiarity, and effective 
utilization requires numerous players. The requ i rement for 
more players and the time required to effectively train the 
players put unacceptable constraints on the usage of this 
model. Another important factor was the additional variances 
induced by having numerous teams of players. For these 
JTLS was not chosen as the model for this thesis. 
(2) Research Evaluation system Analysis (RESA). 
RESA is a computer-based simUlation of the 
nava l warfare environment that focuses on the command and 
control issues of a naval battle group. RESA is not 
di s tinctly a low or high re s o lution s imulation . It c a n 
support simu l ations fro m the theater level down to the single 
platform leve l with e q ual abi lity . The system is designed f or 
human in t e ract i ve deci s ion making but also supports t h e 
a b ili t y to s c ript forces f or consis t ent actions in simUla t ion 
replays. RESA was s elec t ed due t o these featUres a nd t he 
relative ease wi th wh ich opera t o rs become fami liar wi th sys t e m 
c omna nds. 
III. EXPERIMENTAL PLAN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This experiment utilized 24 subjects from the Nava l 
Postgraduate school (Appendix A). The subjects were chosen 
from both the staff and student population to obtain an 
adequate sample size. Each player participated in a wargame in 
which they were to act as the tactica l commander and perform 
in a decision-making role during a specific scenario. Each 
simulation required only one person to play at a time to 
remove any variance of different groups in the decision-making 
process. Each simulat ion contained a particular level of 
information; however, the player was not aware of this until 
after completion of the run. Data were col lected for each run 
for later qUantitative analysis. 
B. PURPOSE 
1. Real World Prable. 
Modern warfare has evo lved to a leve l in which the 
control of information has become the vital link to mission 
accomplishment. This type of warfare has been termed 
"Information Warfare", and has elevated the importance of the 
command and control systems in use today as well as thos{! 
planned for the future. A commander's information system is 
now thought of as a weapons system used by the commander and 
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his staf f instead of o n l y a communicat ions dev i ce . Technol ogy 
is advancing at such a rap id r ate that the commander and his 
staf f requ ire a system which meets v arious informati on 
requirements . 
Our I ng the po s t Co ld War era, a dec I i ning defense 
budget h a s f o rced comp l i cated decisions concerninq which 
syste ms the milita ry wi ll be allowed to procure . Command and 
control systems are more diff icult to justify b a sed on their 
f unction o f bringing i n f o rmat i o n to the commander. The problem 
is to determi n e t he value o f that i nforma t ion compared to the 
value of anot her weapons system. The concept of value is 
d i ff icul t t o quantify f o r command and control systems using 
class i c al measu r es of ef fec t i veness. 
A wargame is o ne method to test the effectiveness of 
a pa r ti c ular fac tor based o n the abil ity to run several 
repl i cations o f one s c e nari o . The simUlation can be totally 
automate d , or i t can involve human players. The latter type of 
wa rga me is a lso used in a training environment to sharpen 
ski ll s prior t o a ctual use in the real world environment. 
2. Objec tives 
The pr imary o b jective of the e xperiment is to 
det ermine whe the r vari o us l evels o f information a ffected 
ove ra ll r esult s both offensively and defensively in a wargame 
simulat i on. In add i tion, the difference i n performance of 
i nd i viduals from di ff erent warfare specialties was measured. 
3. Approach 
Subjects participated one at a time in a wargame in 
which they acted in a tactical decision making role on the 
side of the Blue Forces in a Naval Battlegroup scenario. The 
opposing force consisted of computer scripted files which were 
run in reaction to the Blue Force's actions. This procedure 
assumed the same opposition for a given size Blue Force 
maneuver. Performance data were collected in the form of 
readouts of the results of every shot taken during the course 
of the simulation. For this experiment, performance is defined 
as numbers of aircraft, such as the number of Blue aircraft, 
reaching the target and releasing ordnance (offensive). 
DefensiVe performance was measured by the number of Orange 
attack aircraft able to launch weapons at the CVBG. These data 
were then translated into a raw data table (Appendix B). The 
raw data table was then reduced to an analysis table for 
further quantitative analysis (Appendix C). The computer based 
statistical package personal computer version of Minitab was 
used as the prime analysis tool. 
The two factors of primary concern were levels of 
information and tactical experience level. Information was 
divided into four different levels (very low, low, medium, and 
high). The two levels of tactical experience were Tactical 
Air and Non Tactical Air. Aircraft carrier fixed wing pilots 
and Naval Flight Officers were grouped in the Tactical Air 
level and all other subjects were grouped as Non Tactical Air 
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(Append ix D). The statistical ou tputs were ana lyzed to 
d e teI"mine criteria fo r accepting or r ejecting s t ated 
hypothesis to help i n ans wering the questi o ns posed b y t he 
exper i ment. 
4. Ant i cipat ed Results 
Of f ens ive and de fensive performance shoul d increase 
within e ach community with each incremental increase in 
i nfo rmat i on level. Ind i v i duals from the Tactical Air communi ty 
are expected to perform s omewhat bet ter than t he Non Tactical 
Air indiv i duals since they most likely h ave been exposed to 
more si tuations in which they made the types of decis ions 
required i n t his t ype o f war game. 
SCOPE OF THE EXPERIMENT 
The Nava l Po s tgraduat e School Warlab facilities were used 
to c o nduc t the simu l a tions over a five week period. Dur ing 
each simu l ation, ass istance was provided by the Warlab Manager 
to run speci fi c script files for the Orange Forces. 
Addi t ionally, two othe r warlab technicians were used to input 
the required sof tware entries for the pla yer for t he entire 
d urat ion of the warqame. Th i s removed the requirement fo r the 
p lay e r s to r eceive any pr i or training f or the RESA wargame 
e nvironment. The subject was only required to make decisions 
and al l computer work was performed by the technicians. 
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D. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
1. Setup 
a. Physical 
The RESA wargame was used for all simul ations, 
which consisted of three pers onal computer workstations in one 
bay of the Naval postgraduate Schoo l Warlah. In add i tion, one 
large s creen tac tical picture was used, simi lar to those used 
in c ommand centers. All players were fam i l i ar with the Tadil-J 
(Link-I!) symbology wh i ch was used to represent various air 
and sur face units. 
b. Test; Subjects 
All participants were u.s. Nava l Officers and 
had attained either a Surface Warfare Officer qualification or 
were from the Naval Aviation Community and designated Pi l ots 
or Naval F l ight Officers. The subjects were divided into four 
groups, each receiving a part icular l eve l of info rmat i on 
(Append i x D). The four groups consisted of an equal number of 
players from the Tac Air and Non Tac Air communit i es. 
Each player had the baseline tactical knowledge 
required to a c tual l y participate in the exper i ment because a l l 
were familiar with the Link-II s ymbology used in the wargame. 
There was no requirement that a player have previous wargame 
experience, but i f he did, the l earning curve was assumed 
negligib l e. Technic al assistance for software entries was 
p r ovided so the player only had to make tactica l deci s ions. 
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Th i s al so removed any v a riance which would have occurred due 
to p r o blems with players entering software entr ies at 
dif f erent rates b ased o n the ir typing proficiency. 
Schedule or Trials 
Each player was given a hardcopy brief ing report 
one d a y p rior to t he ir part i cipation in the experiment. This 
report conta ined scenar i o background, the latest intell i gence 
report, o rder o f ba ttle for both Orange and Blue Forces, along 
wi th a mission descr iption statement and the Rules of 
Engagement (ROE ). All in f o rmat i on provided was unclassified 
since the RESA wargame i s itself unclassified. Four separate 
i n t el ligence br i efs were used corresponding to the four 
i nformatio n l e ve ls ( Append ix E). 
Each pl ayer was given a )0 minute face-to-face 
s tr i ke brief prior t o actually entering the war l ab. This time 
was used to supplement as pects of the game not covered in t he 
b r i ef ing repo r t a nd to ans wer any quest i o ns ( Appendi x F). 
Genera l procedures for the fl o w of the warqame were d i scussed; 
h owever, detai ls concerni ng what was being measured were not 
briefed unt il t he completion of the simulatio n run. 
After the initial brief, the subject was shown the 
equipment conf igura tion and proper procedures used to control 
stat us boards as we l l as those used to control display 
inf ormat i on . This 15 minute period was used to fami liarize 
each player with the simula ted Command Ce nte r e nv i ronment. 
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During this time, each player submitted to one of the lab 
technicians a list of aircraft to be used in the assigned 
offensive strike mission. This was done to enable the 
technician to begin inputting data entries to reduce the time 
required to complete the run. 
The assigned mission for each player entailed 
conducting an offensive strike mission on a target in North 
Korea as well as maintaining an appropriate defensive posture 
(Appendix G). In the scenario the North Korean forces were 
supplied with TU-16 Badger aircraft to provide the Orange 
Forces with a capable platform providing a serious threat to 
the CVBG with the AS-5 (Kitchen) air-to-surface missile. 
The scenario was designed to have the player 
develop a course of action for the airstrike(s) into North 
Korea. Once North Korean airspace was violated, the Orange 
Forces were scripted to launch alert aircraft in reaction to 
the position of the Blue Force's strike package aircraft. A 
scripted offensive strike from various airfields in North 
Korea was then launched in response to the Blue Forces 
aircraft (Appendix H). This reguired the player to develop a 
proper defensive strategy against raid aircraft. To help 
maintain the stress level for the player, each was required to 
also identify unknown air and surface tracks within a 
dete rmined radius around the CVBG. 
Actdi tionally, three intell igence updates were 
provided to the player at pre-determined points during the 
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s imula t i on ( Appe ndi x I) . The content o f t h e upda tes 
corresponded to t he leve l of information received i n the 
ini ti a l brief . 
At the conclus ion o f the simulation, the player 
wa s d ebriefed on the out c ome of his run and was asked to fill 
out a wri tten debr i e f quest i onnaire to be u s ed for qualitative 
analy sis (Ap p e nd ix J) _ Th e player was also told what 
i n f o rmat ion was bei n g recor d ed as well as the goal of the 
e xper i"Jlent. 
2. Hypothese s 
The level of i nf o r mat i o n has no e ffect on a player 's 
p erfor ma nce i n a wa rgame. 
The player 's warfa re specialty has no effect on h i s 
performanc e i n a wargame. 
3 . Assumptions 
The fol lowi ng facto rs were assumed at the cor..mencement 
o f the exper iment: 
1. RESA is a va l i d model . 
2. The data a re ind ependently identically distri buted (iid) 
from normal populat ions with equal variances. 
3 . All p l ayers ' skill levels regarding the symbology and 
te rmi n ology were t h e s ame. 
4 . There was no learning curve in ef fect, and i f a player 
had played RESA be f o r e , any learning c urve effect would b e 
neg l i gib l e. 
4. Statistical Design of Experiment 
The statistical design of the experiment included 
dividing the 24 participants into four groups with an equal 
allocation of tactical experience level within each group. The 
group assignments were made randomly (Appendix D). Data were 
recorded for a total of 24 simulation runs, with six runs in 
each resolution group. 
5. Measures 
Measurements focused primarily on aircraft attrition. 
The two primary measures were number of Blue str i ke aircraft 
reaching target and number of Red Force TU-16 Badgers reaching 
their weapons release range. Other measurements recorded how 
well players actually complied with the ROE. Player debriefs 
aided in q uali tative analysis and provided insight into some 
of the p layers' decisions during the simulation (Appendix J). 
E. INSTRUMENTATION 
1. Warlab Manager 
The Warlab Manager was involved early in the research 
to imp l ement the authors' scenario in RESA. This i nvolved 
inputting the correct Orange and Blue Forces into their 
respecti ve units or bases. Computer script files were 
generated to provide all Orange Force movements, which were 
based on a tripwire system. During each simulation, the War lab 
Manager was responsible for generating Orange Force response 
by the use of the script files (Appendix H). He performed 
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th is f unct ion whi I e manning a computer station in a separat e 
a r e a o f t he Warlab, which was not seen by t he player. At th i s 
s t a tion he was a ble to constantly moni tor the status of t he 
entire g a me by the use o f a computer network, which tied all 
RESA c omputers t o gether. Addi tionally, he was responsible for 
the p r o per sch e d u l ing of the simulation runs and ensuring all 
required a s sist ance would b e ava i lable. 
2. Navy Technicians 
Two Wa r lab technicians were utilized during the 
simulations fo r i nputt i ng a l l software commands for the Blue 
Force playe r . The two U.S. Navy Operations specialists had 
been assigned t o the Warl a b Staff, and both had extensive 
e x peri enc e wi th t he RESA Warg ame. Having the same technicians 
enter t he data for every run removed any variance from 
differences in typ ing abilit ies of the players. Thus, the 
p layers could concentrate o n keeping track of the tactical 
p i cture , mo ni toring statu s boards, and making decisions. 
Both l a b t e c hnicians were responsible for the 
launch ing o f a ll ai r c ra f t a s per the player's orders. 
technici a n c oor dinated t he actual overland strikes and 
supporting s t rike suppo r t a ircraft. The second technician 
c oord i nated a ll other a i rcraft (i.e., defensive combat air 
control, surface search aircraft, airborne tankers, a nd 
helicop t e r s). The t echnicians were not in an advisory role for 
the player. They re sponded to questions by t h e play e r as to 
aircraft and weapons status, but did not advise the player for 
any tactical decisions. 
3 . Authors' Roles 
During each simulation, one author remained with the 
player to act in a staff role. He ensured the player had all 
the correct displays required, translated the player's 
commands into entries for the technicians, and answered 
questions concerning ROE and aircraft status. The second 
author remained in the back bay with the War lab Manager to 
ensure the proper computer script files had been executed and 
to act as a l iaison with the player computer bay. 
1". MODEL VERIFICATION 
1. Testing 
Once the computer script fi l es were written and coded, 
an extensive testing period was required to ensure the model 
performed as expected. This period lasted approximately two 
weeks. It consisted primarily of changing numbers of Orange 
aircraft at various bases and refining Orange air-strike 
composi tions. 
2. pilot Trials 
The final testing phase for verification consisted of 
actually running the simulation with players. First, the 
authors played RESA and attempted to use as many different 
strike routes as possible to ensure all script files were 
sUfficient in providing a reasonable force in relation to one 
28 
CV8G. Next, one player was brought in to play, and his run was 
used to determi ne if the simulation was valid. His run was not 
used in a ny a nalys i s. Af ter the final pilot trial, the 
technicians and the War l ab Manager had part icipated in six 
pract i ce runs a nd we r e e xtr emel y proficient at a l l software 
comma nds the game required. 
G. DATA DESCRIPTION 
1. Des cripti o n of s cri pted scenarios 
The computer s cript f iles were based on a tr i pwire 
s ys t em and wer e executed in response to the act ions of the 
Blue Fo r ces . The ini tial scripts were based o n survei llance 
r i ngs a r ound Nort h Korean bases. When Blue Force aircraft 
arrived inside t hese ri ngs , intercept aircraft were l aunChed. 
Addit ional scr i pt fil es were written to add commercia l air 
t ra ffi c and North Korean mi l itary training flights into the 
simUlat ion. -The final script fi l es created a three axis Orange 
Force o f fensive action o n the Carrier Battl e Group (Appendix 
H ) • 
2. Data Collection 
Data were collected pr imarily by computer resources i n 
the f orm of an e ngageme nt l og which kept track of all aircraft 
loss e s ( Appendi x K). In addition, an aircra ft t al ly log was 
mai n tained wh i ch included strike packaqe numbers as well as 
the mi s sion f o r each ai rcraft (Appendix L ) . 
Data collection ProblellS 
There were three runs which had to be excluded because 
of data collection problems. The authors felt the data were 
invalid for the three runs because of a mi sunderstanding of 
orders . Consequently, the player's forces either suffered 
excessive attrition rates or attr i ted excessive Orange Forces. 
The problems were technical in nature and were no fau l t of the 
player, so the data were deemed unusable. Because of this 
problem, out o f the 27 runs actually completed, only 24 of the 
runs were counted in the analysis portion . 
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I V . ANALYSIS 
A. ANALYS I S PLAN 
The da ta ana lyzed both quanti tat i vel y and 
qu a litat i vel y . The qua nt i tat ive approach was twofo l d. First, 
s t a ti st i c ally sig nif i cant correlations be tween the t wo 
d if fe rent warf a re c ommuni tie s and the four leve l s of 
i n tel l igence i n format i o n were determined. Second, a mean 
value differential ana lysis was performed on applicable 
fac to rs t o asses s the r e lative amount of change in the 
me a su r e s of effecti veness with regard to warfare community a nd 
inte l ligence i n f o r mation l e v e l . 
The quali t atiVe appro a ch consis ted of SUbject ively 
r eviewi ng t h e Player Debrie f Forms (Appendix J) to determine 
if any trends e xisted in the planning and execution of 
individua l playe r strategies. This method permitted the 
i n terj ect ion of l i kely reasons to expl a in the results of the 
qua ntitative analysis . 
8. PROCEDURE 
The anal ys is me tho ds desc ribed above we re employed to 
determine what effects wa rfare s pecialty and i nt.e l ligence 
informat ion l e vels had on the abil ity of a CVBG commander to 
successfully conduct an ai r s tr ike against a l and target wh i I e 
simul t ane ously maint aining an active CVBG defensive posture. 
First, Measures of Performance (MOPs) are discussed to provide 
a base l ine for player performance. Second, important 
Measures of Effectiveness (HOEs) are derived from the MOPs to 
accurately reflect player effectiveness in mi ssion attainment. 
This established the relationship between the data col l ected 
and the MOEs identified. Third, the investigat i on methodology 
is outlined to establish the format of the analysis. finally, 
the analysis was performed to gain i nsight i nto the research 
quest ions. 
~. Measures of Performance (MOPs) 
MOPs indicate the performance level of a system or 
collection of systems in accomplishing its designed task. I n 
the RESA simulation these attributes are reflected in the 
various status tables available during the game. In additi o n, 
variou s summaries are compi l ed at the completion of play for 
further review. These summaries are described bel ow. 
The Detection Log is a record of all radar, electronic 
a nd visual observations identified by both f o rces. It i s, 
therefore, a reflection of a platform's identification system 
performance. 
The Position Log chronicled the geographic posi t i on of 
every unit at various points in time. This log i s 
indication of an element's tracking system performance. 
The Engagement Log provided a record of every 
engagement bet ween Blue and Orange forces. The data included 
time of e ngagement, forces invo l ved, weapons utilized, h its or 
miss es and targets des t roye d. This log is an indication of a 
unit's ta rget ing syst em and engagement performance. 
2. Measures of Effect iveness (MOEs) 
MOEs can be t houg ht o f as indicators that reflect "how 
much" better one system i s compared to another. (Thomas, 1985, 
pI ) Gen e r a lly, o n e MOE canno t adequately characterize all the 
actio ns a nd interact ion s that take place among the principle 
variables; therefore, severa l HOEs are often ut i lized to help 
describe the behav ior of the variables. For this reason HOEs 
s hou ld not be consid e red as solely measures of optimization, 
but also as me asur e s that indicate degrees of variable 
in teractions. ( Thomas, 1985, p6 ) Recall that the following 
research questions posed for analysis in Chapter I were as 
f ollows : 
wllat is the effective improvement or degradation, if any , 
to the str i k i ng capabili ty of the batt l e group if C'I i s 
improved ? 
What is the effective improvement or degradation to t he 
defensive capability of the battle group if C'I i s 
i mproved? 
Ho w effective is C' l as a Batt le Group Force MUltiplier in 
a Li tto r a l Envi ronment? 
In o rder t o effectively answer these questions, HOEs 
tha t cor r ect l y measure the degree of change in offensive and 
defensive c apabil ities a re important. Once these capabilities 
are determined, the resul ts can be aggregated to ref lect the 
effectiveness of c"r as a Force Multiplier. 
The relevant MOEs derived from the Engagement Log were 
as follows: 
(1) Number of strike aircraft reaching target 
(2) Number of strike a i rcraft reaching target based on the 
number of strike packages 
( 3) Percent of strike aircraft reaching target 
(4) Percent of strike aircraft reaching target based on the 
number of strike packages 
(5) Number of Orange 8adger aircraft attri ted prior to 
weapon release point 
(6) Number of Orange Badger aircraft attri ted prior to 
weapon release point based on the number of defensive (CAP) 
aircraft launched. 
The first four HOEs directl y measure the offensive 
capabilities of the player and thus will be used to analyze 
the first research question. The last two HOEs measure the 
defensive skill of the player and wi l l be used to examine the 
second research question . The final question will be answered 
by aggregating the first two HOEs into an overall 
effecti veness measure. 
3. Analysis Factors 
Each of the above listed HOEs were applied wi t h regard 
to warfare specialty and information level. Since only two 
warfare communities were utilized, this approach was straight-
forward. Information levels were considered in the four 
speci fied l e v e ls a nd also b y c ombining t he t wo lowest t i ers 
(l e vel 0 a nd 1 ) a nd t h e two h ighest ti e rs ( l evel 2 a nd J ) for 
a total o f two l evels. This was done primarily because there 
was a dist inct b reak in the quality of information provided 
betwe en levell and 2. This difference in informat i o n 
prima r ily relat e d t o det ection and engagement ranges as well 
as mo re acc urate inf o r mat i on on enemy force quanti ties and 
locat i o ns (App e n d i x E ). 
Addit iona lly, the number of air intercepts/escorts and 
surface c ontac t ide nti f i cat i o ns was analyzed to evaluate how 
wel l the ROE was fol lowed. A final study was c o nducted to 
a scerta in the impor t a nce o f the intelligence b r ief/Updates 
provided to t he p layer s. 
C . METHODOLOGY 
APpendix M c o ntai n s a comprehensive analysis of the data 
c o ll e c t ed . Numerous one-way analyses of variances (ANOVAs) 
were co nducted t o dete rmine if statistically signi f icant 
relatio nsh ips exist ed. Most of the ANOVAs did not reveal 
signi f ica nt di fferen ces between the variables. Although 
tWenty- f o u r sub j e c ts par ticipated in the experiment, they were 
effect ive l y d i v i ded i n to eigh t groups (Appendix D). This 
r educed t h e sample 5 i ze ot each group to three; therefore, 
s t at i stica l l y significant va lues could not be expected with 
suc h a sma l l sampl e size . In order t o furt her analyze the 
d a ta f or tre nds, a mea n va l ue differen t i a l a nalysis 
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performed, allowing the differences in means to be evaluated. 
Charts depicting various re l ationships were a l so utilized when 
necessary to emphasize significant trends. 
The following summary briefly explains the format of the 
analysis methodology and l ayout of Append i x M. The first MOE 
(number of strike aircraft reaching target) will be used as an 
exampl e to describe the procedure utilized in the ana l ysis of 
al l HOEs. 
1. Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
The first step was to utilize the one-way ANOVA to 
ana l yze the variances on the HOE with regard to warfare 
specialty and information level. Information level was 
eva l uated for both commun i ties combined and separately 
(Appendix M, Sections A through D). The relevant hypotheses 
for part A are as follows: 
HQ: The mean number of aircraft reaching the target is the 
same for both communi ties, i. e., the means are equal. 
H, : The mean number of aircraft reaching the target is ~ 
the same for both communities, i.e., the means are not 
equa l . 
The question that the hypotheses address is: "Are these 
outcomes the same?" 
The important features of the ANOVAs are the mean 
values, confidence intervals and p-values. The mean number is 
simply the average va l ue observed for the particular treatment 
l evel. In this example the mean nUmber of aircraft reaching 
the t arge t was 18. 5 83 and 18 .167 for the TACAIR a n d NON-TACAIR 
commun i t i es , respec t i vel y ( Append i x H, Section A) . 
The confi dence intervals are a ll b a sed on a 95% leve l 
of c o nf i dence which means that the probab il ity is 95% that the 
interval includes the true mean value . In this example the 
o bserve d mean va lues are dep i cted on the confidence interva ls 
and t he r ange of the inte rva ls represent the area in which the 
t r ue va lue lies with probability of 95%:. The issue is whether 
or not these intervals o ver l a p. If they do, then the result 
is tha t t here i s n o d ifference between the numbers; however, 
if they do not overlap, then the n umbers can be j udged 
differ ent. 
The P-value represents the lowest level of 
s ign i f i c ance at wh ich the null hypothesis can be rejected. I n 
other wor ds, it i s the sma l lest level at which the results are 
s i gnif ica nt. In this example these numbers could be j udged 
di ffere n t i f a 10% l e vel of confidence is acceptabl e, since 
t he P-value is 0. 898. Thi s value is obtained by subtracting 
t he P-value from 1. 
I n t he analyses o f a l l the HOES, a conf i d ence i nterval 
of 9 5% was s electe d a n d t hus the P-value has to be less t h a n 
o r equa l to 0 . 0 5 f or t h e determinat i on that t here is a 
di fference betwee n the treatment values. 
2. Mean Value Differential Analysis (MVDA) 
The next step was to examine how much deviation there 
was between the observed value and the mean. This permitted 
the observation of important, a l though not statistically 
s ignificant, trends. This analysis was performed onl y for 
information l evels since the d i fferences from the mean for 
warfare specia l t i es is easily recognizable. This analysis was 
performed for both four and two levels of information. 
3 • Graphs and Charts 
Appropr i ate graphs and charts were uti lized to 
supplement the ANOVAs and in some instances in place of the 
mean va l ue differential analysis and are contained in Appendiz 
M. This was the case in the examination of the number and 
percentage of aircraft arriving on target wi th regard to 
strike packages launched, and with the number of Badger 
aircraft destroyed based on the number of CAP aircr aft 
l aunched . In these instances the graphs and c harts more 
clearly depict the s i gnifi c ant trends. 
RESULTS 
1. Nwaber of strike Aircraft reaching the Target 
This value was ut i lized to measure the actual amount 
of ordnance placed on the target. Since the ordnance l oadout 
of each type a i r c raft was pre-determined (Appendix E, section 
E), the amount of ordnance delivered was directly related to 
the number of a i rcraft arr i ving on target. The effects of 
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warfare specialty and info rmation level were examined to 
a s s ess their impact on the number of a ircraft reaching the 
ta r g e t . 
a. Jiarfare s pecialty 
The mean n umber of strike aircraft reaching the 
t arget wa s not s olely depe ndent upon t he commun i t y. The ANOVA 
d i d not show a ny statistically signif icant relatio nship. In 
fact, both c ommunities were able to p ut sl i ght ly more than 
eigh teen aircr a f t o ver t h e ta rget (Appendix H, Section A) . 
b . Infor aa t ion Level 
The i mportanc e of i nformat i on, although not 
stat i stica l ly significant , had an impact. A mean differentia l 
ana lys is showed an i ncreas e in the mean numbe r o f a i r c ra f t 
reach i ng the target as the i nforma ti on l e v e l increased (4 
level s). The mean d i fferent i al analysis for the first HOE i s 
sUl!l1llari zed in the t abl e o f Ap pend i x H, Sect ion E. The grand 
mean i s the mean v a lue of the ent i re populat i on (a ll twenty-
f our values). This va lue is divided into three mean values 
representing c ombi ned , TACAIR and NON -TACAIR. These values 
are the mean o f me ans for each of the three categor i es and are 
der ived f rom s ect i o n B through D, respectively. For examp l e, 
the mea n number for the TACAIR c Ol!l1llun i ty is 18. 583 which 
c or r e s pond s to the va lue obta ined a bove in the ANOVA, warfare 
specialty ana lysi s . Th i s number i s also the mean numbe r f r om 
the f our information l eve l s of part C. The mean dif fe rential 
is obtained by comparing the mean value from each information 
level with the mean from its respective community. For this 
example the mean for TACAIR level 0 is 18.00 which is 0.583 
less than the mean for TACAIR, thus the differential for 
information level 0 is -0.583. All other values are obtained 
in a similar manner. This analysis highlights the fact that 
an increasing trend in the number of aircraft reaching the 
target from each warfare community individually and combined 
occurred as the information level increased up to level 2; 
however, the value decreased for level 3. It also shows that 
the NON-TACAIR community experienced the greatest improvement 
and least degradation since the differences between leve l s was 
greatest between 0, 1 and 2 while at the same time less 
between 2 and 3. Figure 1 is from Appendix H, Section E and 
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Figure .1 : MVDA of Numbe r o f aircraft reaching the target 
ba s ed on four informat ion l evels. 
The mean number of ai rcr aft reaching the target i ncreased from 
the mean val ue for bot h communities combined and individually 
up to info r mati on leve l 2: however, the value decreased at 
level 3 . This resul t was c o ntrary to what was expected. I t 
was ant icipated that the p e rformance woul d steadi l y increase 
as information level i ncreased. The reason for this is not 
total ly cleari howe ver, some possibl e reasons a re discussed. 
The explanation might be attributed to the number of 
strike packages launched. It was noticed that individuals 
t hat l aunched more s trike packages tended to lose more 
a ircraft (MOE 2). Ano t her factor may be because the player 
d id not have a s t a ff to h e lp him manage the i ntelligence data 
and track symbology. A third reason may be due to the random 
distribution of players into the four categories. The level 
3 part i cipants may have had a "lower" skil l level than the 
rest of the population. 
The results for two information levels, on the other 
hand, were significantly different. The NON-TACAIR community 
showed an improvement in the number of aircraft reaching the 
target but the reverse was true for the TACAIR cOlllJlluni ty. 
Figure 2 from Appendix M, Section I is the mean differential 
analysis. This might also be attr i buted to the number of 
strike packages launched. 
F~gure 2: MVOA of number of a~rcraft reach~ng target based 
on two information levels. 
2. Number o f s trike airc raft reaching target based on the 
mmber o f str i ke packages 
As t he number o f str i ke packages launched increased, 
the number o f airc raft reac h i ng the target decreased (Appendix 
H, sectio ns S thr ough AL ) . Figure 3 is from Appendix M, 
Section Z and s hows the r ela tionship between aircraft reaching 
the target a nd s t rike packages launched for both communities 
combined. 
--
Figure 3 : Number of aircraft reaching target based on number 
of s t rike packages launched . 
a. Warrare Specialty 
The mean number of strike packages launched was 
dependent upon the communi ty. The TACAIR c ommunity launched 
a mean of 1.5 strike packages compared to the 1.917 from the 
NON TACAIR (Appendix H, section T and AA). 
b. Infor.ation Level 
The number of strike packages l aunched by each 
community was affected by the information level received. The 
TACAIR community had less variance in the number of strike 
packages launched as information level increased. The mean 
number launched was 1.67 for levels 0, 1 and 3, and 1 for 
l evel 2 (Appendix H, section AB). Thi s resulted in a 
noticeable increase in the number of aircraft on target at 
information level 2 (MOE 1 analysis). The NON TACAIR 
community had more variance in the number of strike packages 
launched as information level increased. The mean number 
l aunched was 2, 2.33, 1.67 and 1.67 for levels 0 through 4, 
respectively (Appendix H, Section AC). The larger difference 
in the mean number of strike packages launched between level 
1 and 2 contributed to the larger mean value differential as 
described in t he MOE 1 analysis. An interesting fact is that, 
except for the one instance when three strike packages were 
launched, this community was able to get more of their 
aircraft to the target ( Appendix H, Section u through Y, AB 
and AC). 
The analysis when based on two information l evels 
il lustrates that both communities launched fewer strike 
packages as the information level increased and thus were able 
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to pu t a g reater number o f a ircraft on target . The di fference 
in the n umber o f packages launched f r om the NON-TACAIR 
conunu n i ty wa s g r eater than for the TACAIR c ommunity as the 
informat i on l evel i n c reased. This difference highlights why 
t he NON- TACAIR c ommuni ty exhibited more improvement in getting 
t he s t rike a irc r aft t o the tar g e t (MOE 1 analys i s ). Figure t, 
i s f rom App e nd ix M, Sec t i on AL and depicts this result. 
Figure 4 : Number of s t r ike packages launched based on two 
informat i on levels ( bot h commun i ties) . 
I n bo th cases ( 4 levels and 2 levels) as the 
number of strike p ackages increased the amount of effort 
req uired t o man a ge the strike groups expanded. Thi s caused 
many players t o " lose the big picture" and inhibited their 
a b i lity t o e f fec t i ve l y manage the strike packages. 
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). Percent of strike aircraft reaching target 
This MOE is utilized because it provides a different 
aspect on overall performance in getting strike aircraft to 
the target. The actual number of strike aircraft launched 
varied from 8 to 34 aircraft; consequent l y, the ~ 
reaching the target can be misleading as to the player's 
actual performance. For example, suppose player "A" launched 
10 aircraft and 9 reached the target, and player "B" launched 
)0 aircraft and 15 reached the target . Based on the number of 
aircraft, player "B" did better, but he lost 50%: of his 
aircraft while player "A" only lost 10%. Unfortunately the 
percent of aircraft reaching the target does not give any 
indication of how many aircraft were launched , or reached the 
target, and thus how much ordnance was dropped. Nonetheless, 
i t is an important MOE. 
Warfare specialt:y 
The mean percent of strike aircraft reaching the 
target was dependent upon the community. Al though the ANOVA 
did not show a statistically significant relationship, a 
definite difference was noted between the communities. The 
TACAIR community's performance was 13% better (Appendix M, 
section J). 
b. Inforaation Level 
Information level was an important factor in 
determin i ng the percentage of strike aircraft reaching the 
targe t. The mean va lue differentia l analys is sho wed an 
increase i n the mea n percentage of aircraft reaching the 
target as t he informat i on level increased (<:. levels) with the 
highes t increase occurring at information level 2. Figure 5 
i s fr om Appendi x M, sect ion N and shows this result. 
Figure 5: MVDA o f the percent of aircraft reachi ng t he 
t arge t based on four information levels. 
Aga in, the pl ayer performance at level J decreased sliqhtly 
from the previous level. The possible reasons for this may 
also be at trib u ted t o those d i scussed i n the previous MOE. 
The results for two information leve l s was similar 
al though not as dramatic ( Appendix E, section R). As was the 
c ase i n t he numbe r of aircraft that reached the target, the 
NON TACAI R c o mmun ity s h owed the greatest improvement. 
4. Percent of strike aircraft reaching target based on 
the nUll1ber of strike packages 
The percentage of a ircraft arriving at the target was 
similar to the number when based on the number of strike 
packages launched; that is, a higher percentage reached target 
with less strike packages. Figure 6 is from Appendix M, 
section AP and shows the percentage of aircraft with regard to 
the number of strike packages. 
Figure 6: Percent of aircraft reaching the target based on 
number of st r ike packages launched. 
warfare specialty 
The percentage of strike aircraft reach i ng the 
target was a lso dependent upon the community; however, in this 
case the TACAIR c ommunity did appreciably better when o ne 
str ike package was launched and slightly better when two were 
l aunched . Fig ure 7 is from Appendix H, Section AQ and shows 
t h e r e lationship between percentage of aircraft arriving 
t arg et and strike packages launched for both communi ties. 
iirr.; 
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Fl.gure 7 . Percent o f al.rcraft reachl.ng the ta rget based on 
the number of strike packages l aunched. 
b. Infor.ation Level 
Information 1evel has no bearing on the percent of 
ai rcraft reaching the targe t since information level only 
affects the se l ect i o n of the number of strike packages 
launched . See MOE 2 fo r analysis of the effect of information 
leve l on the number o f strike aircraft reaching target based 
on the number of strike packages. 
5. NUlllber of Orange Badger aircraft attrited prior to 
weapon release point 
The defensive expertise of the players was primarily 
measured by the number of Orange Badger a i rcraft destroyed 
before reaching their weapon release point. The total numbe r 
of Badger aircraft launched to attack the CVBG was fifteen 
aircraft for every scenario. The Badgers conducted a three 
axis strike as outlined in Appendix H. 
a. Warfare special ty 
Nei ther community eliminated signi f icant l y more 
aircraft than the other. In fact, both warfare specialties 
destroy ed slightly more than five Badgers (Appendix M, Section 
AR) • 
b. Imor.ation Level 
The number of Badgers killed based on four levels 
of information was slightly better at level 1 for the TACAIR 
communi ty and partially better at level 2 for the NON TACAIR 
community (Appendix M, Sections AS through AV). Figure 8 is 
the mean va lue differential analysis from Appendix M, section 
AV and shows the result. The possible explainations for this 
level) result are the same as those previously outlined. 
I "0" CO''' ' , 
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l"igure B : MYOA of t he number of Badger aircraft killed based 
o n four i nformation levels. 
Th e results based on two informat i on levels i s 
e ven less s i gni f icant (Appendix M, Section AZ j . 
Nuaber of Orang e Badger aircraft attrited prior to 
weapon release poi nt based on the number of defensive 
(CAP) aircraft launched 
This MOE was s elected because it measures the number 
Badger aircraft attrited as a func t ion of CAP aircraf t 
launched. As the number of CAP aircraft launched increases, 
the number of Badger aircraft destroyed should increase 
(Appendix H, Se ction SA through BK). Both communities 
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combined launched between eight and twenty-four aircraft. 
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Figure 9: Number of Badger aircraft killed based on the 
number of CAP aircraft launched. 
a. Warfare specialty 
The mean number of CAP aircraft launched for both 
communities was slightly more than thirteen (Appendix M, 
section BB). 
b. Infor.ation Level 
The TACAIR community launched slight l y more CAP 
aircraft at information level land 3 and slightly less at 
information level 2 (Appendix H, Section BD). The NON TACAIR 
c ommunity was consistent with the previous analyses b y 
launc hing an i nc reaSing amount of CAP aircraft as the 
information level increased peak i ng at level 2 and then 
d ecreasing slightly at l eve l 3. Figure 10 is the mean 
differentia l analys i s and depicts the results. 
Figure 10: MVDA of the number of CAP aircraft launched based 
on four informa tion l evels. 
The results based on two information levels 
a ctually show t ha t the TACAIR community launched less CAP as 
t h e in forma tion leve l increased while the NON TACAIR commun i ty 
launched more (Ap pendix M, sections BH through BK 1. Figure 11 
portrays this resu l t. Although there was no c lear reason why 
t his occured, a possib le explanation may be t hat t he TACAIR 
players felt they had a better understanding on t h e amount of 
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CAP aircraft that would be required to adequately protect the 
CVBG. The NON TACAIR players, on the other hand, may not have 
felt comfortable with the number of CAP aircraft that would be 
required and, therefore, launched more. 
F~gure 11: MVDA of the number of CAP a~rcraft launched based 
on two information levels. 
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 
Rul es of engagement were established for two reasons. 
First , they provided structure to the game ensuring that all 
players followed the same engagement procedures (Appendix D, 
section C). Second, it was uti lized as a secondary MOE to 
evaluate the player's command and control ability with regard 
to defensive force management. The player was required to 
iden tify selected airborne and surface contacts. This demand 
kept t h e player busy whi l e the strike package was being 
a ssembl ed a nd enrout e to the target as well as added a degree 
of realism to the scenario. 
All players c omplied with the ROE with regard to 
engagements and no signif icant dev i ations were observed. It 
was a lso expected that there wou l d be no difference in the 
number o f unknown con t ac ts identif ied. The resu l t was that 
nei ther community perfo rmed better than the other in contact 
i dent if icat i on . In fact, the mean number of contacts 
identi fi e d for both communities was exact l y 8.75 each 
( Appendix H, Section BL ). The mean value differential 
ana lysi s based on four and two leve l s of information did not 
sho w any appreciable difference as information level var i ed 
(Append ix H , Se ct ions BM through BO). 
F. I NFORMATION BRIEF RELEVANCE 
The f actors cont ai ned in the "Initial Intel l igence Brief" 
we re examined fo r re l evant information to player strategy 
development. The in i tia l brief contained background 
information and was constant in a l l l eve l s of information; 
however, the speci f ic informat ion about Orange defensive 
strategy and the composition of forces at each base varied 
among levels of information (Appendix E, sections B through 
E). Each br ief contl!li ned pertinent information in t he 
f ollowing six areas: a irc raft, surface-to-a ir missiles (SAM), 
radar surveillance, defensive strategy, operational 
communications and logistic information. During the debrief, 
each player was queried about the re l evance of each type of 
i nformation and asked to rank the importance of each. The 
most important factors identified were SAM info r mation, 
aircraft data and radar surveillance information. Although 
there was some minor deviations in the exact ranking of each 
factor with regard to communi ty and information l evel, these 
three clearly were most important (See Appendix H, Sections BP 
through BR for further details). 
G. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 
This analysis consisted of reviewing all the players' post 
miss i on debriefs for trends. This form was divided into two 
major sections: Mission P l anning and Intelligence Data 
(Appendix J) . F i rst, the data were examined based on warfare 
special ty to determine if either communi ty' s strategy was 
different. Second, the data were evaluated based on 
information level. The data were also anal yzed based on 
warfare specialty .Il.O.Q information level but there was not any 
significant differences noted. 
1. Warfare specialty 
Both communi ties' choice of ingress route (s) were 
based on the desire to avoid major population centers and 
military installations, and minimize the amount of time that 
the strike package(s) were in enemy territory. specific 
a ttention was given to radar, SAM site and enemy fighter 
aircra f t avoidance. 
The number and type of aircraft selected for the 
strike package ( s ) was a lso similar for each community. The 
des ire to inf lict max i mum damage and provide sufficient 
suppor t f or the attacking aircraft were uniformly stressed. 
Both communi ties a l s o plac ed significant emphasis on defense 
of the CVBG; however, this concern was slightly greater in the 
NON-TACAIR community. 
The s election of strike aircraft egress route(s) was 
common between communi t i es. The over-riding factor was the 
desire to tak e the short est, most direct path to expedite the 
e gress. The NON-TACAIR players were more likely to modify 
their egress plans and take different r outes if s i gnificant 
o ppositio n was encountered on the primary route. The TACAIR 
players were more likely to utilize their pre-determined route 
e v e n if strong opposition was encountered. 
Both communities were also similarly sat isfied with 
the in i t ial intell igence briefs and cons i dered them helpful in 
strategy planning. Neither warfare specialty cons i dered the 
intelligence updates especially essential; however, the TACAIR 
players fe lt they were slightly more helpful than did the NON-
TACAIR people. 
2. Information Level 
Ingress routers) were selected to expedite the str i ke 
and minimize the amount of time in enemy terri tory. The 
route ( s) utilized sought to avo i d population centers and 
military bases. As the levels of information increased, the 
p l ayers incorporated the increased k.nowledge about the enemy 
dispos i tion into their ingress plan; however, this did not 
appreciably a l ter the routers) selected; a direct route was 
still preferred . 
The number and type of aircraft s e lected for the 
strike did not vary significantly between information leve l s. 
Maximizing ordnance placed on target was emphasized and 
protection of the CVBG was c onsidered; however, the players 
with the "Low" information level expressed the greatest 
concern for CVBG defense. 
Selec tion of egress routers) was influenced by the 
desire to utilize a direct route which provided the quickest 
path to ex i t the enemy country. NO spec i fic group 
demonstrated any significant desire to alter their route as 
the information level increased. 
The usefu l ness of the initial intel l igence br i ef and 
upda te messages varied from each level. The players i n the 
"Very Low" and "Low" categories felt the information lacked 
details with regard to enemy type and number of airc raft, 
radar ranges, SAM sites and defensive strategy; therefore, 
they did not feel the information prov i ded helped them perform 
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t h e mi ss i on . The upda t e messages provided i nformation that 
some t h i ng was happening, but was not specific enough to alter 
postur es . The "Medi um" and "High" level people were more 
supp ortive of t he va lue of the initial intelligence brief. 
They were pro v i ded with more details and thus were able to 
glean more va luable infOrlllation from the brief: however, this 
i nformation did not signifi c ant ly alter the selection of 
ingres s of egress route (s). I t did g i ve a more complete 
p i c t u re o f the opposit i on and the updates were more valuable 
i n t hat they prov ided a better warning about the retaliatory 
s trike. Unfortunately these groups did not perform any better 
wi th regard t o destroying the attacking Badger aircraft, nor 
did they get more airc raf t over the target, especially at 
l evel 3. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. ANTICIPATED RESULTS 
The purpose of the experiment was to determine if tactical 
performance in the RESA wargame was different with respect to 
information provided as well as trying to determine if the 
members of t he Tactical-Air communi ty performed any 
differently than the Non-Tactical-Air community. Prior to the 
experiment, the authors expected that t here would be an 
incremental improvement in both offensive and defensive 
performance wi thin each of the warfare commun ities as the 
level of information increased. It was also anticipated that 
the players with more Tactica l -Air experience would have 
better results than those players in the Non-Tactical-Ai r 
category. The follow i ng conclusions will attempt to explain 
the three pr imary research questions stated earlier, as well 
as suggest some possible reasons for results that differed 
from what was anticipated by the authors. 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. Offensive Performance 
The offensive performance of all players was 
determined by examining the first four HOEs defined in Chapter 
IV. These HOEs measured the total number of strike aircraft 
reaching the target, percentage of strike aircraft reaching 
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the ta r g e t , a s well a s both of these categories based on the 
number of str ike packages launched. 
The a nalysis indicates that warfare specialty had no 
effect on the total number of strike aircraft to actually 
s trike the target. However, since each player chose both the 
si ze and number of the strike packages required to accompl i sh 
the miss ion, the t o t al number of aircraft to reach target as 
well as percentage of the strike aircraft launched to actually 
r each targe t a re both important. Both communi ties were able to 
get appro ximately t he same mean number of aircraft to the 
t arget. However, with percentage of aircraft over target being 
a functi o n of number of strike aircraft initially launched, 
t he TACAIR community was able to get 13% more aircraft over 
t arget, which indicates the NON TACAIR community suffered 
greater losses on ingress routes. One of the most prominent 
di fferences in the warfare communities appeared in the D..1.Ull..Qtl 
o f strike packages used by each. The Non-Tactical-Air 
community tended to use more strike packages than the Tacair 
c ommunity, and the analys is indicates that as a player used 
more packages, his offensive performance tended to decrease. 
Overal l, as the level of information increased, the 
total nUmber o f strike ai rcraft reaching target and percentage 
o f strike aircraft reaching target both increased, however, 
the increase was not i n an incremental fashion as was 
anticipated pr ior to the experiment. Generally the first three 
levelS exhibi ted an increase, however, the results of the 
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highest l evel of information dropped off slightly. As 
previously discussed, the authors are unable to explain 
exact ly why this occurred, but suspect that the players might 
have experienced "information overload", in which too much 
information was supplied to the commander during the game, and 
the players were unable to maintain the proper situational 
From direct observation during the simUlation 
runs, the authors did notice that it seemed as if players in 
the highest information level did encounter "information 
overload" at approximately the same po i nt in the simUlation, 
due to the length of the information update messages. 
Information f l ow to the commander also influenced t he 
number of strike packages used by the player. As the level of 
information to the commander increased, he tended to use fewer 
strike packages. This trend appeared in both communities, but 
was more predominant in the Non-Tactical-Air community. 
Players who were given a lower level of information tended to 
use more packages. The authors suspect the extra packages were 
possibly used to counter unknown threats that the players were 
unsure about due to the poorer l evelS of information provided 
them. with a higher level of information flow to the 
commander, it appears that assets were used more effectively 
in accomplishing the mission. Th i s in essence is an example 
of information systems acting as a force mult iplier for the 
commander. The commander was able to achieve better resul ts 
( in t h i s case, more ordnance on target), wi th a given set of 
fo r ces, when h is l e ve l of information f l ow was increased. 
Defensive Performa nce 
Defens i ve resul t s differed from those anticipated 
prior to the experiment. Analysis indicates that neither 
warfare community was ab l e to achieve a bette r defensive 
pos t ure a g a inst a formidable threat to the CVBG in the RESA 
simulat ion. Both commun i t ies were able to attri te about the 
same number of Orange a ttack aircraft prior t o the release of 
their weapons. 
Information level also tended to not affect the 
players' d e fensiv e r esults. No specific trends are apparent 
in the mean number of Orange attack aircraft attrited prior to 
weapon launCh. This resul t was a l so d i fferent from what the 
authors had ant icipated pr i o r to the experiment, so further 
analysis was pe rformed to examine possible r easons for no 
di fference in defensive results based on four information 
l evels . 
Analysis ind i cate s that the number of fighter a i rcraft 
a c tua l ly launched a s CAP ai rcraft had no effect on the number 
of Orange attack airc raft actually destroyed prior to the 
launch o f weapons. P layers that launched 24 CAP aircraft shot 
down the same n umber of Orange attackers as those that only 
l aunched eight CAP ai rc r a f t in some instances. The dec i ding 
f a ctor in determining d e f e nsive results was how we l l the 
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aircraft were contro l led after they were airborne, not j ust 
total numbers of aircraft. During this phase of the game the 
player was involved offensively in ensuring the strike 
packages encountered the minimum threat as we l l as maintaining 
a proper defensive posture. Those players with excessive CAP 
aircraft airborne were sometimes unable to maintain the 
tactical picture because of "informati on over l oad" and control 
of the airborne forc es was adversely affected. The players 
had the forces required to accomplish the mission, but were 
unable to correctly make t actical decisions fast enough to 
counter the threat. 
I n summary, defensive capabilities did not seem to be 
affect ed by warfare community or information fl ow to the 
commander. The manner in which those forces were control l ed 
once they were airborne could have been the primary reason for 
the results. In addition, since this simulation invo l ved a 
man-in-the-loop, this could have been caused by variance 
between the players or other factors such as how the ROE were 
int erpreted or the actual way the scenario was designed. 
This type of experiment also ident ifies probl ems 
assoc i ated with the man-in-the-loop decision model for testing 
and experimenta l purposes. It does include a high degree of 
real i sm since human players are actua l ly making the decis i ons; 
however, it also increases the cost and the du r at i on of the 
s i mulation runs. In addition, the use of human players inserts 
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a high variance stochas t ic element into a simulation which 
mig h t otherwise b e determin istic. (Hartman, 1992, p16) 
It is import ant to emphasize that this type of 
e xp e riment does not provide a complete, all encompassing 
answer t o a researc h que s tion . If one were conducting tests of 
t wo s ystems to d e termine which performed better than the 
oth e r, a simulat ion without t he man-in-the-loop element should 
be used. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Co ntinued r esearch i n this area is highly recommended to 
f urther analyze s ome of the questions r a ised by this 
experiment . The RESA simulation provides an excellent tool 
fo r r esearching various aspects of command and control issues . 
Other topics o f poss ible interest are the "information 
overload" conc ept in a wargame as well as questions posed by 
the authors in the previous section. 
VI. LESSONS LEARNED 
A. EXPERIKENTAL DESIGN 
The authors found the entire research effort to be 
extremely chal l enging in several respects. The man-in-the-loop 
type of simulation is difficult because one must solicit 
volunteer participation from a particular group of individuals 
who have the skills required for the experiment. The following 
list includes valuable lessons learned during the early phase 
of man-in-the-loop model development, when the actual design 
of the mode l was being developed. The authors provide the 
following guidelines: 
1. Limit the number of factors for which the effects are 
being measured, as well as the different levels of those 
factors. In this experiment, the two factors examined were 
information flow (four levels) and warfare specialty (2 
levels). This allowed only three samples of each particular 
configuration, which introduced excessive amounts of 
variation due to the small sample size. Larger cell counts 
are recommended i f enough players are able to participate. 
2. The procedure of having each participant play one 
scenario only one time prevented any l earning curve effect. 
The authors did consider several options, such as having one 
player play one scenario at different levelS of information, 
but decided against any p lan that involved a learning curve 
effect. Having different versions of one scenario and hav i ng 
each player participate one time did prevent any learning 
curve effect; however, it did require more participants than 
any of the other methods. 
3. Decide on measures of effectiveness early in the 
experimental development. This will help determine what type 
of data analysis will be conducted after the collection of 
all data . Dec i d ing on MOES early also prevents misdirected 
t i me and efforts in recording non-essential data. 
B. DATA COLLECTION PHASE 
The following list contains lessons learned during the 
actual simu l a tion runs as well as early pract i ce runs of the 
scenario . 
1 . Limi t t he scope of the simulation to achieve a reasonable 
maximum time requi red f o r completion of a single run. 
2. Ensure al l assis t ance from lab technicians is briefed in 
detai l so all personnel understand exactly what their duties 
are so each run is conducted in exact l y the same manner 
every time. 
). Be prepared for players to ask a l most any type of 
question and for the players to use several different ways 
to p e rform a mission. All tactical possibil i ties must be 
cons i dered in the planning phase of the scenar i o. 
4. Player briefs r.lust be we l l structured, organized, and 
most i mportant o f al l , br ief and concise. 
5 . Proper coordination with the Lab Manager is crucial for 
g enerating script f i les, scheduling lab time for the 
s i mUlation runs, and ensuring that proper procedures were 
followed during the simulation. 
APPENDIX A: SIKULATION PARTICIPANTS 
1. LT Jeffrey Carlson, USN, SH-6B Pilot 
2. LCDR Kevin Crawford, USN, F-14 NFO 
3. LT Jack Davis, USN, Surface Warfare 
4. CDR Robert Ellis, USN, P-3C NFO 
5. LT Gary Formet, USN, F-14 NFO 
6. LCDR Charles Fuller, USN, SH-60B pilot 
LT Jeff Gregoire, USN, A-6E NFO 
8. LT Christopher Halton, USN, Surface Warfare 
9. LT Thomas Halverson, USN, Surface Warfare 
10. CDR Thomas Hoskins, USN, Surface Warfare 
11. LT Donald Johnson, USN, SH-60B Pilot 
LT Daniel Knaus, USN, E-2C NFO 
13. LT Robert Laubengayer, USN, CH-46 Pilot 
LT John Manser, USN, F-14 NFO 
15. LT Michael McFerren, USN, E-2C NFO 
16. LT Kurt Meisenheimer, USN, P-3C NFO 
17 . CDR Steven Meyers, USN, E-2C NFO 
18. LT Charles Minter, USN, EA-6B NFO 
19. LT Michael Moats, USN, E-2C NFO 
L'l' David Rymer, USN, SH-60B pilot 
LCDR James stewart, USN, P-3C NFO 
22. LT Steven Tackett, USN, EA-6B NFO 
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23. CDR St e phen Wa l ker, USN, F-14 NFO 
24 . LT Donald Zw i ck , USN, EA- 6B NFO 
Col1 Col2 





Appendix B: Basic Experimental Results 
Col3 Col4 ColS Col6 Col7 
Stk Pack Sup Pack EA68 Eft Stk Lnch Esc Lnch 
























: l"foc:o.at :on L~v"l; V~"Y l.ow = 0, ;'ow ~ 1, Me dium = 2 , 
Hl qh L 1 
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Appendix B: Basic Experimental Results 
CO" Col. Col10 Col11 Col12 Col13 SSuplnt SSupExt StkLostl EscLosU SSpLostl StkLostE 
• 3 3 5 7 0 2 7 
0 0 0 10 
0 ,. • 10 3 7 
• 1 0 12 2 12 
0 1 0 
3 11 0 • 0 0 0 11 
10 7 2 8 
2 1 1 











0 • 3 
SSUp Int: Nu.:fIb"r of Stn~" Support .urcraft launch"d that were 
"'ternal to the Stn~e Package. 
SSUp EKt: Nu.:flber of Stri k" Support aHcraft launched that were 
e~ternal to th" Str,k" Package . 
Ilwnber of Escort a,<craft lost dU[lnq ,nqr"'5 5. 
SSpLostl' NwnberofStr,k ... supportaacraftlostdurlnqln':!res5 . 






Appendix B: Basic Experimental Results 
Col15 Coll6 Col17 Colla Col 19 Col20 Col2l 
SSpLostE NKLnchl NKLnchE NKLostl NKLostE CAP Lnch CSupLnch 
1 33 0 8 2 8 5 
1 0 33 0 5 16 9 
3 0 33 0 0 14 8 
42 0 40 0 14 14 
42 0 17 3 10 9 
0 15 0 9 8 10 
72 0 16 0 10 11 
0 38 0 15 20 9 
24 0 18 6 14 11 
0 33 0 8 10 9 
18 0 0 5 12 3 
23 0 12 7 12 12 
47 0 32 8 4 
24 0 20 8 
0 33 20 8 
0 33 1 12 10 
33 14 12 5 
33 6 20 9 
0 33 4 8 10 
5 18 8 16 10 
5 42 2 17 14 7 
38 0 8 13 14 8 
38 0 10 0 17 10 
33 5 24 12 
N,.d, ~ , of OL~"ge ai r cra ft I a um:;r.ed dunr.q Blu<' ~"gre ~s 
N' ''''.b .. ~ of Ounge .. i~crd t Ion d'~r i ng lIlue ~nqres s. 
N=.be ~ of Ou n q e a i rcr a ft Io~ t du"in q Blue e gr e~s . 
CS Up LClC h r-.:urnb .. r of CAP Sup po r t a ~ rcr .. f t l .. u n ch .. d . 
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Appendix B: Basic Experimental Results 
Col22 Ccl23 Col24 Col25 Col26 Col27 
CAPLos! CSupLost Bad Lost ASS Lnch BEscLost Clc lD 
0 7 10 , 
0 12 6 12 
0 13 7 9 
0 10 5 12 
4 0 10 5 10 
0 0 15 12 
9 14 9 
11 10 7 
10 10 11 5 
5 9 10 6 
, 12 , 
3 15 12 
7 10 0 , 9 7 
13 11 6 
7 , , 
3 15 10 
14 15 12 






AS S Lr.ch: N=b~c o[ O<d"Q~ Badg er alrcratt le>st p < ' ''' t r. 
"'e~pon R"le a ,e ?oint. 
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Col28 
Bluel nch , 47 
3 64 



















Appendix B: Basic Experimental Results 
Col29 Col30 Col31 Col32 Col33 Col34 Col35 
BlueLost NKLnch NKLost Aircraft SAM Logistic OPComm 




2 6 5 
35 60 
" 
2 6 5 
32 69 62 3 5 
" 
69 40 3 6 
10 42 36 1 
43 99 3' 2 
27 65 32 3 5 
32 51 39 2 5 
31 60 23 2 6 
37 45 25 6 5 
12 50 46 2 6 
30 74 43 NA NA NA NA 
44 51 19 1 3 4 
43 60 17 2 1 5 
24 60 17 1 3 6 
19 60 39 3 5 
37 60 33 3 6 
30 60 24 3 5 
40 50 30 
21 74 38 
" 
65 42 
40 65 30 
37 60 36 
. To~ " l numb'" of Orange ~ircr~!t launched. 
P Ll y (! r r a nlung of dir~raft data ~mportanc .. . 
~l ay .. r rar:i<ing of SAM. d"t" irrq>ortanc<'. 
Pl"y"r ranbng o f iog:~t ~ c d " ta 1:nport<>.nce. 
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Appendix B: Basie Experimental Results 
Col36 Col37 Col38 Col39 COl40 Col41 Col42 
Air SUN Def Stgy NTA ale TA ale NTA SAM TA SAM NTA LOG 
NA NA NA NA 2 NA 





























Playe ~ ranki n\! of u<:la< data importan~e. 
Def Stgy: PlaYH ran~lng of Orange <:I efe,nive :otute\!y data .mpo.tance . 
: NON - TACAIR p laye , ran)"n\! of aucuft data .mportance . 
TACAIR playe. unUng of a a c r a ft d5t& i.rnpon. nce. 
NON- TACA.IR pla yH unlt.ng of SAA data ,mportance 
: TACA!R playe r ranbn9 of SAM data 1mporta nc e . 
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Appendix B: Basic Experimental Results 
Col43 Col44 Col45 Col46 Col47 
TA LOG NTA COMfJ TA COMM NTA SUN TA SUN 
6 NA 5 NA 


























TACA1R ;> lay e e ean:,inq of Loqi ~ tic da~a i'"P0e~ance. 
N:;lN - TACA:R pl"y~~ <~nkir.q o t op'HatHl",~ l cO=l1.lIucation 
dH.a ;;t1porta",ce . 
InA SUt v : !lON- TAC,,"lR i'~"y"L un:nnq ot r adar d~l ~ ~rr.po~t anc .. . 
TA Suey : TAC.>.IR p layer ra",bng o! ndar d~t. a ln1)0,tan ce. 
mA S~qy: NOX- TASAIR pLayer un~~r. \I n f OLan\l" detensive ~ t <· ~t eqy 
data l '"P 0n~"c~. 
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Appendix C: Analysis Data 
Col1 Col2 Col3 Col4 ColS Co IS Coil cola 
War Spec Level Stk Pack Sik TGT %Stk TGT CAP Lnch BAD Lost Gtc ID 
1 0 2 13 0,8125 8 10 
0 0 1 24 1 16 6 
0 20 1 14 7 11 
1 12 0428571 14 5 8 
0 9 0.75 10 5 10 
0 23 0.958333 8 0 7 
1 4 025 10 2 9 
28 1 20 9 8 
15 0.833333 14 11 5 
34 1 10 10 6 
18 0642857 12 4 8 
20 0833333 12 5 10 
21 0.875 8 5 11 
19 0.730769 20 3 11 
11 0.916667 20 5 7 
20 0.909091 12 7 9 
31 0.96875 12 9 11 
27 0964286 20 10 
23 0.958333 8 10 
21 0.75 16 8 
8 1 14 10 
21 0875 14 11 
11 06875 17 9 
















Appendix G: Analysis Data 
Gol2 Gol3 Col4 GalS Col6 Col7 
Level Stk Pack Stk TGT %Stk TGT CAP Lnch BAD Lost 
0 1 24 1 16 6 
1 1 20 1 14 7 
0 2 9 0.75 10 5 
2 23 0958333 8 0 
2 34 1 10 10 
3 11 0.916667 20 5 
1 31 0.96875 12 
3 23 0,958333 8 
2 8 1 14 
21 0.875 14 
11 0.6875 17 
8 0.5 24 
Warf"re Special ty; TACAIR. 
lr.torma tion Level; Very Low · 0, Low ~ 1, Mediw.m . 2 , Hi gh ~ 3 
NumbeL of Strike Packages laur.chect. 
:-lumber cf Strike a.l. rcra ~t r eaching t a rget. 
~~~:~~~~e C~; ~~~~~:f~i~~~~!~e~~aChing target. 
Gol8 
Gtc ID 
e tc :D : ~=:~ ~~ ~~~~~~nB~~~~~c~;r~~:;~i;::~ . prior ~o launc hing weapon~. 













Appendix C: Analysis Data 
Col1 Col2 Col3 Col4 ColS ColS Col? Co l8 
War Spec Level Stk Pack Stk TGT %Stk TGT CAP lnch BAD lost Ctc ID 
1 2 13 0.8125 8 10 8 
1 3 12 0.428571 ,. 5 8 
2 • 0.25 10 2 9 
28 1 20 9 8 
15 0.833333 1. 11 5 
18 0.642857 12 • 8 20 0.833333 12 5 10 
2 1 0.875 8 5 11 
19 0.730769 20 3 11 
20 0.909091 12 7 9 
27 0.964286 20 10 
21 0.75 16 8 
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Appendix C: Analysis Data 
Col1 Col2 Col3 Col4 ColS Col6 Col7 Col8 
War Spec level Stk Pack Stk TGT %Stk TGT CAP lnch BAD lost CIciO 
1 0 2 13 0.8125 8 10 8 
0 0 1 24 1 16 6 3 
0 0 20 1 14 7 11 
1 0 12 0.428571 14 5 8 
0 0 9 0.75 10 5 10 
0 1 23 0.958333 8 0 7 
0 4 0.25 10 2 9 
1 28 1 20 9 8 
15 0.833333 14 11 5 
34 1 10 10 6 
18 0.642857 12 4 8 
20 0.833333 12 5 10 
21 0.875 8 5 11 
19 0.730769 20 3 11 
11 0.916667 20 5 7 
20 0.909091 12 9 
31 0.96875 12 11 
27 0.964286 20 10 
23 0.958333 8 10 
21 0.75 16 8 
8 1 14 10 
21 0.875 14 11 
11 0.6875 17 9 
8 0.5 24 10 
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Appendix C: Analysis Data 
Col1 Col2 Col3 Col4 ColS Col6 













0 24 1 
0 20 1 
0 9 0.75 
1 23 0958333 
1 34 1 




21 0 .875 
11 0.6875 
8 0.5 
WlIrt .. re Specia lty ; 
I n fo rmation Level: ..,ow ~ 0 , High - 1 . 
N",...!>" r of S trike Pacok"'l "'s l aunched . 
TGT Nu:r,be r of S tr i~e ai rcra ft re aching targe t. 

























BAD Lost Number of Orang" B .. dge r a ircraf t l ost p rior to laun c hi ng ",,,a?ons . 
etc I D Numbe r ot u n k nown cont a c ts identified . 














Appendix C: Analysis Data 
Col 1 Col2 Col3 Col4 Col5 Col6 Col7 Col8 
War Spec Level Stk Pack Stk TGT OfoStk TGT CAP Lnch BAD Lost CtclD 
1 2 13 0.8125 8 10 8 
1 3 12 0.428571 14 5 8 
2 4 0.25 10 2 9 
28 1 20 9 8 
15 0.833333 14 11 5 
18 0.642857 12 4 8 
20 0.833333 12 5 10 
21 0.875 8 5 
" 19 0.730769 20 3 11 
20 0.909091 12 7 9 
27 0.964286 20 1 10 
21 0.75 16 6 8 
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APPENDIX D: PLAYER DISTRIBUTION 




1 - L~Dlk M~:::=OrJ 
LOR !'!eyers 
l.T ~inter 
APPENDIX E: INTELLIGENCE BRIEFS 
A. INITIAL INTELLIGENCE BRIEF (ALL PLAYERS) 
Background 
a. Navy 
The North Korean Navy is largely a coastal defense 
force consisting mostly of small patrol craft, missile attack 
boats, corvettes, amphibious craft and mine warfare units. 
Although these units do not possess a sustained blue water 
operational capability, some units have been observed 
operating a significant distance from the coast for lim i ted 
amounts of time during increased tensions and crises. These 
platforms do not pose a serious threat to an aircraft carrier 
battlegroup: however, vigilance is recommended. 
The Naval organization is comprised of two fleets: 
East and West. The East Coast Fleet has its headquarters at 
Toejo Dong with major bases at Najin and Wonson. The west 
Coast Fleet is headquartered at Nampa with major bases at Pipa 
Got and Sagon Ni. Mi nor bases are established in various 
locations along both coasts. 
The Navy's most capable surface threat to a 
carrier battlegroup is the guided-missile patrol boats; these 
are versions of the Soviet designed 05A-1 units. They 
estimated to have 25 of these small patrol craft. All 
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equipped wi th the STYX missi l e launchers and carry the SS-N-2A 
anti-ship mi s sile. These smaller craft usually remain within 
50 NM of the North Korean coastline to police territorial 
waters but have been observed to travel out further i nto the 
Sea of J apan for certain exercises. 
b. Air Force 
The North Korean Air Force's primary mission is 
defense of the homeland. This is accomplished by an intricate 
air defense network of fighters, surface-to-air missile (SAM) 
sites and anti-aircraft artillery sites. Their combat aircraft 
inventory consists of approximately 250 aircraft of the 
following types: Mig-19, MiG-21, Mig -23 and Mi G-29. 
Additionally, they possess the capability to perform long 
range tactical air strikes with their newly acquired Badger 
aircraft from the former soviet Union. They are estimated to 
have obta ined 20 to 30 of these aircraft. 
c . Air Defense 
The North Korean's approach to air defense 
ref l ect s their experiences during the 
consequently, much effort has been taken to repe l or at least 
reduce the damage inflicte d to its industry and military 
installation s d ue t o attacks by enemy air forces. As a result, 
air defense is a t op priority. The air defense network employs 
a combination of antiaircraft guns with SA-2, 5A-3, SA-5 and 
5A-7 surface-to-air missiles to provide an extremely dense air 
defense network. 
B. VERY LOW LEVEL INITIAL INTELLIGENCE BRIEF 
1. Defensive strateqy 
Li ttle is known about the North Korean command and 
c ontrol structure; however, it is known that they divide the 
country into various sectors of responsibility with a contro l 
base being accountable for coordinating the use of SAM sites 
and fighter aircraft to engage attacking aircraft. Each of the 
be l ow discussed a i r bases is a contro l center and will execute 
the defensive strategy whenever a strike penetrates their area 
of coverage. MiG- 19 and MiG-21 aircra f t are not very capable 
and are only a serious threat if they are in very close 
prox i mi ty to a potentia l target. Fortunately, their short 
range weapons and short combat radius l i mit their ability to 
p ursue attack i ng aircraft; therefore, these aircraft can 
easi l y be outrun and outmaneuvered. The MiG-23 and MiG-29 
aircraft are far more c apable. They have longer range 
missi l es, a longer combat radius and greater speed; therefore, 
they can be expected to aggressively pursue attacking 
a i r c raft. 
Intelligence SUlIIlaary Very Low 
a. chongjin 
13 aircraft counted at fie l d outside hangars. 2 structures 
at field that appear to be hangers. 
SAM radar emissions; type and quantities unknown. 
Air-search radars pres ent; operating parameters and range 
unknown. 
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Increased message traff ic between chongjin and Hamhung. 
Increased l ogist i c support vehicle traff ic; contents 
unknown. 
b. songjin 
22 aircraft counted at field outside hangars. 
4 hangars located at field. 
SAM radar emissions; type and quantity unknown. 
Air-search radars present; operating parameters and range 
unknown. 
Routine message traff ic between songj in and Pyongyang. 
High amount of message traffic between songjin and 
unidentif ied locations. 
Routine logistic support vehicle traffic. 
c. Hamhung 
15 aircraft counted at field outside hangers. 
5 primary structures at field, type unknown. radar 
emissions - type and quantity unknown. 
Air-search radars present; operating parameters and range 
unknown. 
Increased message traff ic between Hamhung, Chongj i n , 
Wonson and Pyongyang. 
Routine logistic support vehicle traffic. 
9 aircraft counted at field outside hangars. 
SAM radar status unknown; last SAM emissions detected 10 
days ago. SAM faci lities possibly down. 
Air-search radars present; operating parameters and range 
unknown. 
Increased message traffic between Wonson and Hamhung; 
appears to be operational in nature. 
Increased logistic support vehicle traffic; contents 
unknown. 
e. Pyongyang • capital city. 
46 aircraft counted at field outside hangars. 
NUmerous large structures at field, type unknown. 
Numerous SAM facilities and emissions; type and quantity 
unknown • 
Numerous air-search radars present; operating parameters 
and range unknown. 
Increased message traff ic between Pyongyang, Chongjin, 
Hamhung, Won son and Kanggye. 
Routine logistic support vehic l e traffic. 
f. Sinuiju 
25 aircraft counted at field outside hangars. 
7 large structures at field, type unknown. 
SAM radar emissions present, type and quantity unknown. 
Air-search radar present, operating parameters and range 
unknown. 
Increased message traffic between Sinuiju and Kanggye. 
Routine logistics support vehicle traffic. 
g. Kanggye (TARGET) 
No recent information as of this date. Most likely have 
sophisticated air defense capability. 
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h. Remote SAM/AAA Sites 
Numerous remote SAM/AM sites are deployed 
throughout t h e country t o help defend against attack. Usually 
they are deployed in defense of major cities, military bases 
and supply routes. Most sites are along the coast; however I 
some are located in l and. 
C. LOW LlNEL INITIAL INTELLIGENCE BRIEF 
1. Defensive Strategy 
The North Koreans utilize a coordinated scheme that 
combines SAM sites and fighter aircraft to counter a i r 
threats. The strategy consists of dividing the country into 
various sectors of responsibi l ity with a control base being 
accountable for coordjnating the use of ~ and ~ 
~ to engage attacking aircraft. MiG-19 and MiG-21 
a i rcraft are not very capable and are only a serious threat if 
they are in very c l ose proxi mity to a potential target. 
Fortunately, their short range weapons and short combat radius 
limit the i r abi l i ty to pursue attacking aircraft; therefore, 
these aircraft can easily be outrun and outmaneuvered. The 
MiG-23 and MiG-29 aircraft are far more capabl e. They have 
longer range missiles, a longer combat radius and greater 
speed; therefore, they can be expected to aggressively pursue 
attacking aircraft. Each of the below discussed air bases is 
a control center and will execute the defensive strategy 
whenever a strike penetrates their area of coverage. Incoming 
strikes are detected by air-search radars, ground units and 
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naval assets and are relayed to the nearest control center 
where that base wi l l activate its SAM sites and scramble 
fighter aircraft. Estimates vary but it is expected that the 
base will scramble a ~ number of aircraft to intercept 
the enemy strike package. 
Intelligence Summary Low 
a. Chongjin 
13 aircraft counted outside hangar facilities: 4 Bombers, 
9 Fighters . 
2 structures at field. 1 hanger and 1 weapons storage 
facility. 
SA-2 and SA-3 SAM radar emissions; multiple sites, 
quanti ty of each site is unknown. 
Air-search radars in continuous operation, operating 
parameters unknown, range estimated from 30-70 nm. 
Increased message traffic between Hamhung and Chongjin. 
Contents include aircraft readiness and updates about US 
CV battiegroup composition. 
Higher than normal amount of air-ground transmissions. 
Increased logistic support vehicle traffic. Contents 
believed to be weapons, type ordnance unknown. 
b. songjin 
22 fighter aircraft counted outside hangar facilities. 
4 hangars located at fie l d. 
SA-2 and SA- 3 SAM radar emissions, multiple sites most of 
which are not at a i rfield and appear to be at random 
distances from Songjin. 
Air-search radars in continuous operation, operating 
parameters unknown, range estimated from 30-70 nm. 
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Routine message traf f i c between Songjin and Pyongyang. 
High amount of message traffic between songjin and 
unidentifi e d locations. Contents include readiness 
reports a nd ordnance status. 
Routin e logist ic support vehicle traff ic. 
Normal to slight l y below normal amount of a ir-ground 
transmiss ions. 
c. Haahung 
15 fighte r a ircra ft count ed outside hangers. 
3 hangars , 1 weapons storage faci l ity and 1 communications 
facility. 
SA-2 and SA-3 SAM radar emissions; multiple sites, 
quanti t y of each s ite is unknown. 
Air-search radars in c ontinuous operation, operating 
parameters unknown, range estimated from 30-70 nm . 
I ncreased message traffic between Hamhung, Chong j in, 
Won son and Pyongyang. Contents include aircraft readiness, 
logistics support and updates about US CV battle group 
composition. 
Routine logistic support vehicle traffic. 
d. Wonson 
9 Bomber ai rcraf t counted at field outside hangars. 
4 hangars and 1 weapons storage facility. 
SA-2 radar sites are up and SA-3 site is not operational, 
ant i cipate site operational soon. 
Air-search radars present; operating parameters unknown 
and range estimated from 30-70 nm. 
Increased message traft ic between Wonson and Hamhung; 
contents include logistic information, aircraft readiness 
reports and pilot efficiency reports. 
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Increased logistic support vehicle traffic; contents 
include radar parts and ordnance. 
e. Pyongyang * capital city * 
aircraft counted at field outside hangars; 3 Bombers 
and 43 Fighters. 
10 hangars, 2 communications facility, 3 weapons storage 
depots, and numerous hardened bunkers. This is the hub of 
al l command and control activities for the country. 
Multiple SA-2, SA-3 and SA-5 SAM sites 1 quantities unknown 
and exact locations undetermined. 
Multiple air-search radars present; operating parameters 
and ranges from between 30-70 nm. 
Increased message traffic between Pyongyang, Chongjin, 
Hambung, Wonson and Kanggye. Contents incl ude aircraft 
readiness data, pi l ot efficiency reports and logistics 
data. 
Routine logistic support vehicle traffic to songjin, 
Hamhung and Sinuiju, and i ncreased logistic support to 
chongjin and Wonson. 
f. Sinuiju 
25 Fighter aircraft counted at field outside hangars. 
6 hangars and 1 training facility. 
SA-2 SAM radar emissions present, quantity and exact 
locations unknown. 
Air-search radar present, operating parameters unknown and 
ranges from between 30-70 nm. 
Increased message traffic between Sinuiju and Kanggye. 
Contents include flight sortie data and SAM/AAA location 
inquiries. 
Routine logistics support vehicle traff ic. 
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q . Kanggye ( TARGBT ) 
Multiple SAM and AAA sites are operational, exact types, 
quantities and locations are u nknown. 
Increased messag e traffic between Kanggye and Sinuiju. 
content s inc lude flight sortie data and SAM/AAA location 
i nquiries. 
h. Re. ote SAM/AM Sites 
Numerous remote SAM/AltA s i tes are deployed 
throughout the country to help defend against attack. Most 
sites are l oc a ted to the north and south of all bases except 
Sinuiju. A f e w sites are l ocated inland. Exact numbers of 
s i tes and l ocat ions 
are unknown: however, they are believed to be composed of SA-
2, SA-) and ZSU-Z) components. Some sites may also have SA-5 
l aunchers. 
MEDIUM LEVEL INITIAL INTELLIGENCE BRIEF 
1. Defensive strategy 
The North Koreans utilize a coordinated scheme that 
combines SAM sites and fighter aircraft to counter air 
threats. The strategy c onsists of dividing the countr y into 
various sec t o r s of responsibi l ity with a control base being 
a cco untab l e for .Q.QQ.LcL~ the use of ~ and ~ 
~ to engage attacking aircraft. MiG-19 and MiG-21 
aircraft are not very capable and are only a serious threat if 
they are in very close pr oximity to a potential target. 
Fortunately, the i r short range weapons and s hort c ombat radius 
limit their ability to pursue attacking aircraft; therefore, 
these aircraft can easily be outrun and outmaneuvered. The 
HiG-23 and HiG-29 aircraft are far more capable. They have 
longer range missiles, a longer combat radius and greater 
speed; therefore, they can be expected to aggressively pursue 
attacking aircraft. Each of the below discussed air bases is 
a control center and will execute the defensive strategy 
whenever a strike penetrates within 2Q........n.m of the base. 
Intelligence estimates that the chongjin defensive perimeter 
is 30 nm. Incoming strikes are detected by air-search radars, 
ground units and naval assets and are relayed to the control 
center where that base will activate its SAM sites and 
scramble fighter aircraft. utilization of the EA-6B shou l d 
reduce the detection capabilities of the search radars as well 
as reduce the SAM threat. Estimates vary but it is expected 
that the base will scramble a ~ number of aircraft to 
intercept the enemy strike package. It is not known whether 
additional aircraft will scrambl e from other bases or to what 
degree SAM sites not inside of the controlling center's area 
of responsibility will become active. 
Intelligence SUJIOIary MediUlll 
a. Chongjin 
13 aircraft counted outside hangar facilities; 4 Badgers, 
7 MiG-23 and 2 MiG-29 aircraft. 
1 hanger contains 6 additional aircraft; type unknown. 
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Ordnance transfers between weapons storage facility and 
h a ngars has i ncreased significantly. 
Estimate two SA-2 and two SA-3 SAM radar sites, suspected 
locatio n in vicin i ty of airfield. 
Air-search rada rs in continuous operation, operat i ng 
in termittently, detection range estimated from 0 -30 nm. 
Increased message t raffic between Hamhung and Chongjin . 
Contents inc l ude Badger aircraft readiness, air t raff ic 
rou tes, references to "Plan A and Plan B". and updates 
about US CV battlegroup composition. 
Higher than norma l amount ot air-ground and air-air 
t ransmissions. 
Increased logistic support vehic l e traff ic . Contents 
be l ieved to be air-air and air-surface weapons. 
b. songjin 
22 fighter aircraft counted outside hangar facilities ; 
Mig-2 3 , S Mi G-21 and 7 MiG-29 aircraft. 
4 hanga r s located at field contain an additional 13 
aircraft, type unknown. 
5A-2 and 5A-) 5AM radar emissions, Two 5A-) s i tes within 
vicinity of airfield. One 5A-2 site within 60 nm north of 
50ngjin, one 5A-2 site within 60 nm south and two 5A-2 
sites within 60 nm west of 50ngjin, exact locations 
unknown . 
Air-search radars in continuous operation, operating 
parameters unknown, detection range estimated from 0-50 
Routine message traffic between 50ngjin and Pyongyang. 
High amount of message traffic between 50nqjin and 
unlocated SAM sites. contents inc l ude readiness reports, 
ordnance status, and increased alert status. 
Normal to slightly below normal amount of air-ground 
transmiss i ons and routine air-to-air transmissions. 
Routine logist i c support vehicle traff ic. 
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c. Ha:mhung 
15 fighter aircraft counted outside hanger facilities; 6 
Mig-23, 5 MiG-2l and 4 MiG-19 aircraft. 
3 hangars with an additional 10 aircra ft (total) inside 
these facilities. 1 weapons storage facility and 1 
communications/aircraft control facility. 
SA-2 and SA-3 SAM radar emissions; multiple sites within 
vicinity of airfield. 
Air-search radars in continuous operation, operating 
parameters unknown, detection range estimated from 0-50 
Increased message tra ffic between Hamhung, Chongjin, 
Wonson and Pyongyang. Contents include aircraft readiness, 
rendezvous data, Plan A and Plan B composition 
requirements, as well as updates about US CV battle group 
composition and position. 
Routine logistic support vehicle traffic. 
d. Wonson 
9 Badger aircraft counted at field outside hangars. 
4 hangars that contain an additional 20 aircraft 
total. 1 weapons storage facility. 
Three SA-2 radar sites located in vicinity of field are up 
and SA-3 in vicinity of field is not operational and not 
expected to be in near future. 
Air-search radars in continuous operation, operating 
parameters unknown, detection range estimated from 0-50 
Increased message traffic between Won son and Harnhung; 
contents include fighter rendezvous data, Plan A and Plan 
B aircraft coordination schemes, logistiC information, 
aircraft readiness reports and pilot efficiency reports. 
Increased logistic support vehicle traffic; contents 
include radar parts and ordnance as well as air-air and 
air-surface weapons. 
e. Pyongyang * capital city * 
46 aircraft counted at field outside hangars; 3 Badgers, 
6 MiG-29. 14 M.iG-23 I 16 Mig-21 and 7 MiG-21 aircraft. 
10 hangars with an additional 20 aircraft total. 2 
communications/aircraft control faci1i ties, 3 weapons 
storage depots, and numerous hardened command bunkers. 
This is the hub of all command and control activities for 
the country. 
Multiple SA-2, SA-) and SA-5 S.\H sites within airfield 
vicinity and surrounding the city. 
Hul tiple air-search radars present in continuous 
operation , detection range estimated from 0-50 nm. 
Increased message traffic between Pyongyang, Chongjin, 
Hamhung, Won son and Kanggye. contents include aircraft 
readiness data, pilot efficiency reports, Plan A and Plan 
B compositions, rendezvous positions, communication plans 
and logistics data. 
Routine logistic support vehicle traffic to songjin, 
Hamhung and sinuiju, and increased ordnance logistic 
support to chongjin and Wonson. 
f. sinui ju 
25 MiG-21 aircraft counted at field outside hangars. 
6 hangars with an additional 7 aircraft tota l in the 
facilities and 1 training facility utilized for flight 
training. 
Three SA-2 SAM sites presently located in vicinity of the 
airfield. 
Air-search radars in continuous operation, operating 
parameters unknown, detection range estimated from 0-50 
Increased message traffic between Sinuiju and Kanggye. 
Contents include flight sortie data, SAM/AM location 
inquiries and operational status reports, and aircraft 
support updates. 
Routine logistics support vehicle traffic. 
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g. Kanggye (TARGET) 
Three SA-2 and two SA-) SAM sites, as well as two Z5U-23 
AM sites are operational, exact locations are unknown but 
are in close proximity to weapon research facility. 
Increased message traffic between Kanggye and 5inuiju. 
Contents include 5AMjAAA location and status reports, 
aircraft support requirements and communications 
reliability reports. 
h. Remote SAMjAAA Sites 
Numerous remote SAMjAAA si tes are deployed 
throughout the country to help defend against attack. Most 
si tes are located to the north and south of all bases except 
Sinuiju and form a formidable barrier against air attacks from 
the sea . A few sites are located inland along suspected 
aircraft ingress/egress routes in the vicinity of songjin. 
Songjin is a ma jor base, and it has a la rger number of SAM 
sites in its control area due to its central posit ion along 
the coast. Exact numbers of sites and locations are unknown; 
however, they are believed to be deployed near coastal cities 
and around airbases. These sites are composed of SA-2, SA-) 
and ZSU-23 components. 
E. HIGH LEVEL INITIAL INTELLIGENCE BRIEF 
1. Defensive strategy 
The North Koreans utilize a coordinated scheme that 
combines SAM sites and fighter aircraft to counter air 
threats. The strategy consists of dividing the country into 
various sectors of responsibility with a control base being 
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accountable for ~i,.Il~ the use of ~ and .f...i.ghj;.gj: 
~ t o engage a tta c king aircraft. MiG-19 and MiG-21 
a i r c r a ft are not very capable and are only a serious threat if 
t hey are in very close proximity to a potential target. 
Fortunately I their short range weapons and short combat radius 
l imi t their ability to pursue attacking aircraft; therefore, 
these aircraft can easily be outrun and outmaneuvered. The 
Mi G-2J and MiG-29 aircraft are far more capable. They have 
longer range miss i les, a l onger combat radius and greater 
speed; therefore, they can be expected to aggressively pursue 
attacking a ircraft. Each of the below discussed air bases is 
1'1. control center and will execute the defensive strategy 
whenever a strike penetrates within 2O.........n.m of the base. 
Intelligence estimates that the Chongjin defensive perimeter 
is ~. Incoming s trikes are detected by air-search radars, 
ground units and naval assets and are relayed to the control 
center where that base will activate its SAM sites and 
scrambJ e 1 /2 the bases total number of f i ghter a i rcraft to 
intercept the enemy strike package. Utilization of the EA-6B 
should reduce the detection capabilities of the search radars 
as well as SAM effectiveness: however, once detected, the 
number of aircraft scrambled will be as sta ted above. The 
other control centers (those not penetrated) will JlQt become 
active and D.2.t scramble aircraft until their defensive 
perimeter has been penetrated; however, the entire country's 
SAM n e twork wi l l become active. 
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2. Intelligence SUlUlary High 
a. Chongjin 
5 Badgers, 4 MiG-29 and 10 MiG-23 aircraft. 
Ordnance supply contains AS-5 Kitchen, AA-lO and AA-7 
missiles. 
Two SA-2 and two SA-3 SAM radar sites located at a i rfield. 
Air-search radars in continuous operation, detection 
ranges from 0-30 nm. 
Message traffic between Hamhung and chongjin. Contents 
include: Fighter patrol vector information to CV CAP 
aircraft positions, fighter and bomber flight routes, and 
updates about US CV battlegroup composition and location. 
Higher than normal amount of air-ground and air-air 
transmissions. 
Increased logistic support vehicle traffic. Contents are 
air-air and air-surface weapons. 
b. Songjin 
1 5 MiG-23, 10 HiG-29 and 10 MiG-21 aircraft. 
Ordnance supply contains AA-7 and AA-2 missiles. 
Two SA-3 SAM radar sites located at airfield and one SA-2 
SAM site located at each of the following remote 
locations! Kilju, Tanchon, Kapsan and Pungsan. 
Air-search radars in continuous operation, detection 
ranges from 0-50 nm. 
Routine message traffic between songjin and Pyongyang. 
High amount of message traffic between Songjin and remote 
SAM sites. Contents include readiness reports, ordnance 
status, and increased alert status. 
Normal to slightly above normal amount of air-ground 
transmissions and routine air-to-air transmissions. 
Routine logistic support vehicle traffic. 
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c . Haahunq 
10 Mi G-19, 10 Mi G- 23 and 10 MiG-21 aircraft. 
Or d nance supply contains AA-7, AA-2 and Sidewinder 
missiles. 
Tactica l Air combat/strike Operations Center. This 
faci l ity handles coordination of all air defense and 
strike assets for the east coast. 
Two SA- 2 and two 5A-3 SAM radar sites located at airfie l d. 
Air-search radars i n continuous operation, detection 
ranges from 0-50 nm. 
Increased message traffic between Hamhung, Chong j in, 
Wonson and Pyongyang. Contents inc l ude: coordinated 
fighter patrol vector information to CV CAP aircraft 
positions, fighter and bomber rendezvous/flight routes, 
and updates about U.S. CV battlegroup composition and 
location. 
Routine logistic support vehicle traffic . 
d. Wonson 
10 Badgers, 10 MiG-29 and 15 MiG-23 aircraft. 
Ordnance supply contains AS-5 Ki tchen, AA-IO and AA-7 
missiles. 
Three SA-2 and one 5A- 3 SAM radar sites l ocated at 
airfie l d; only the SA-2 sites are operational. 
Air-search radars in continuous operation, detection 
ranges from 0 -50 nm. 
I ncreased message traffic between Wonson and Hamhung; 
Contents include: c oordinated fighter pat ro l vector 
i nformation to CV CAP aircraft positions, fighter and 
b omber rendezvous / ! l ight routes, and updates about US cv 
battlegroup composi t ion and location. 
Increased logisti c support vehicle traffic; contents 
include radar parts and ordnance as well as air-air and 
air-surface weapons. 
e. Pyongyang'" Capital city '* 
10 Badgers, 10 MiG-29, 20 MiG-23, 20 MiG-21 and 10 MiG-19 
aircraft. 
Ordnance supply contains AS-5 Kitchen, AA-I0, AA-7, AA-2, 
AA-8 and Sidewinder missiles. 
Numerous command, control communications faci 1 i ties. This 
is the hub of all command and control activities for the 
country. 
Four of the following SAM sites located at the airfield 
and surrounding the city; 5A-2, 5A-3 and 5A-5. 
Air-search radars in continuous operation, detection 
ranges from 0-50 nm. 
Increased message traff ic between Pyongyang, Chongj in, 
Hamhung, Won son and Kanggye. Contents include: political 
updates, ROE, defense and strike plans, and updates about 
U5 CV battlegroup composition and location. 
Routine logistic support vehicle traffic to 50ngjin, 
Hamhung and Sinuiju, and increased ordnance logistic 
support to Chongjin and Wonson. 
f. Sinuiju 
40 MiG-21 aircraft. 
Ordnance supply contains AA-2 and AA-B missiles. 
Three 5A-2 SAM sites located at the airfield. 
Air-search radars in continuous operation, detection 
ranges from 0-50 nm. 
Increased message traffic between Sinuiju and Kanggye. 
Contents include air defense posture for protecting 
weapons research facility. 
Routine logistics support vehicle traffic. 
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g. !t:anggye (TARGET) 
Th ree SA- 2 and two SA-3 SAM sites, as well as two ZSU- 23 
AAA sites a r e opera ti onal and are in close proximity to 
weapons research facili ty. 
Increased message t raffic between Kanggye and Sinuiju. 
Co ntents inc l ude air defense requests for protecting 
we apons research f acility. 
h. Re:aote SKM./AAA Site s 
Numerous remote SAM/AM sites are deployed 
throughout the country t o help defend against attack. These 
s i t es are l oca t ed near v arious co astal cities and bases and 
are spr e ad from the Chinese border and extend down to the 
b o r der wi th the ROK. Some inland sites are deployed and are 
con t rol led by the base at songjin. These stations are located 
a t the si tes listed in the intelligence summary for songjin. 
These s i tes a re composed of SA-2, SA-3, SA-7 and ZSU-2J 
components. See br iefing map for exact locations. 
FORCE AND WEAPONS SUMMARY 
1 . US Forces and Weapons 
Nimitz Battle Group located approximately 2"/0 nm 
e ast of Wonson. 8attlegroup co.posi tion as 
f ol l ows : 
(1) USS Nimi t z - Nimitz Class (CVN-68)/ Sea Sparrow 
( 2 ) USS Bunk e r Hill - Aegis Class (CG-47)/ SM-2 MR 
(3) USS Jouett - Belknap Class (CG-26)/ SM-2 ER 
( 4 ) USS Caron - Spruance Class (00-963)/ Sea Sparrow 
( 5 ) USS Scott - Kidd Class (000-993)/ SM-l MR 
( 6 ) USS Clark - Perry Class (FFG-7) / SM-l MR 
( 7) USS Boone - Perry Class (FFG-7)/ SM-l MR 
(8) USS Stump - Spruance Class (00-96 3) / Sea Sparrow 
b. Surface-to-Air Weapons 
(1) SM-2 ER / 90 NM Max Range 
( 2) SM-2 MR / 50 NM Max Range 
(3) SM-l MR / 25 NM Max Range 
(4) NATO Sea Sparrow / 7 NM Max Range 
Aircraft onboard Ni.itz 
~ Missions I Weapgns r~' 
20 F-14A 
28 F/A-18 
CAP/Escort / 4 SPAR, 2 PHOE 
Strike/CAP / STRIKE: 2 MK-82 , 1 MK-83, 
/ 1 HARM, 2 SWDR, 4 SPAR 
8 A-6E Strike 
6 EA-6B Jamming 
3 KA-6D Tanker 
2 KS-3A Tanker 
/ CAP/ESCORT: 2 SWDR, 4 SPAR 




8 S-36 Strike/SSC 
5 E-2C AEW 
/ 2 HARPOONS 
/ None 








Med iUm range ASM 
Short range />.AM 
Med i um range />.AM 
Long range />.AM 
Iron 60mb 
Iron Bomb 








1. For game simplicity, these weapons loadouts are 
the only configurations ava i lab l e. 
* F/A- l8 aircraft can be configur ed for either a 
CAP/ESCORT or STRIKE mission. 
d. CAP stations 
(l) 2 F-14 @ 260 degrees 100 nm from CV 
(2) 2 F-18 @ 320 degrees 100 nm from CV 
()) 1 E-2C @ 270 degrees 50 nrn from CV 
North Korean Forces and Weapons 
8. The follOWing airbases/co_and centers are 








(6 ) Sinuiju 





TU- 1 6 









~ / Weapons Loadout 
Air Defense / 2 SWDR 
Air Defense / 2 AA- 2, 2 AA-B 
2I: 4 AA- B 
Fighter/ Attack/ 2 AA-B, 2 AA-7 2.r. 
4 SOD-KG bombs 
Air Defense / 6 AA-10 QJ.: B AA.-ll QL: 
2 AA-9 
Attack / 2 AS-S 
~
Short range AAM 
Medium Range }>.AM 
Short Range AMI 
Long Range AAM 
Medium Range AAM 
Short Range }>.AM 
Short range }>.AM 
Iron Bomb 










c . Surface-to-Air (SAM) inventory 






Medium Range SAM 20 NM 
Medium Range SAM 13 NM 
Long Range SAM 135 NM 
Short Range SAM 3 NM 
Short Range AAA 
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APPENDIX F: PRE-SIMULATION BRIEF 
A . HAP DEPICTING: 
(a) Aircraft type/count 
(b) Air-search radar ranges 
(c) SAM sites/ranges 
(d 1 Target area 
(e) CV Task Force position (260 NM east of Wonsan) 
SCENARIO 
(a) Background 
(b) Mi ss ion 
(c) General ROE 
(1) overflight of South Korea, China prohibited 
(2) Protection of CV 
(3) Maximize bombs on target/Minimize aircraft losses 
(d) AAW ROE 
(1) CAP - aircraft loadout fixed 
(2) 100-150 NM -- VID/Escort (if required)/Comm Air-BO 
(3) < 100 NM -- Engagement (if required) 
If NK & ORD & Warn & WRP then Engage 
(4) > 100 NM -- Engage only if lit-up 
(el ASUW ROE 
(1) Mod-Locked 
(2) < 150 NM -- ID/Track (SSe aircraft) 
( 3) Engagement of NK Naval Forces 
If < 50 NM or Attack Air assets 
(f) AIR-STRIKE ROE 
(1) Over Land - Weapons Free Enemy Air 
(2) Over Water - Engage only if lit-up or AAW ROE applies 
(3) MiG Sweeps are O.K. (if defensive) 
RE-YUELING 
(a) I n-Flight feet dry : will be refueled automatically 
feet wet : player needs to recover or tank 
At 50% planes bingo 
over the target: dump bombs and proceed RTB 
(b) Recover Aircraft: takes time to launch again during game. 
D. LAUNCHING AIRCRAFT 
All aircraft on alert 7, so do not need to worry about alerts. 
106 
E. ASSISTANCE 
( a) Enlist ed -- CAP,HELOS,S-J'S, TANKERS / FEET DRY AIRCRAFT 
(b) Dave - SIMULATED STAFF MEMBER, INTEL FEED, Mit; CIRCUIT 
F. AIRCRAFT PACKAGE COMPOSITION 
(a) Fighter/Bomber - - separation 
( b ) Section/Division/ Single -- splitting 
fe) Aircraft at 20 ,000 ft unless told otherwise 
( d) if EA-6B in g roup, speed on route will be 455 knots 
G. IMPORTANT COMMANDS 
(a) Ships c an't take a specific track 
( b) Weapons free air vs weapons free enemy air 
(el Ships radars off at start of game 
( d ) Planes take off with radars on 
( e) Jamming of EA-68 is initially off 
( El Range circles, X marks, posits, track select 
( g ) ASTABS - F"'fuel, vo=availability, A= aircraft status 
G: int, C= damage 
H . STRIKE PACKAGE LAUNCH 
Within 1 5 minutes of game start. 
I. MISCELLANEOUS 
1. daytime mission - wx is good, visibility is good 
All aircraft on all ships are FMC 
3 . Mig patrols have been common but there has been no 
shooting 
4. Camm Air in the game 
5. Each player gets 3 intel updates 
6. TAKE COMMANDS ARE BETT ER TO USE THAN WEAPONS FREE 
7. Need to tell us what ships you want f i r i ng missiles 
8. activate RBOC and chaff on your command ONLY 
9. NORTH KOREANS KNOW WHERE YOL' ARE AND HAVE PERFECT INTEL. 
BRIEF GIVEN INSIDE IN FRONT OF DISPLAY 
1. LEFT BUTTON == LAT jLONG,RANGE & BEAR I NG 
2. CENTER BUTTON ", HOOK TRACK : GET TN. COURSE. SPEED 
3. X-MARKS. CIRCLES. ROUTES ETC. 
4. YELLOW SYMBOL : FADING 
5. BIG SCREEN SET-UP 
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APPENDIX G: SCENARIO 
A. BACKGROUND 
During the past few years concern for the North Korean 
nuclear research program has become a prime source of 
international importance. The North Koreans have adamantly 
opposed international efforts to restrict their research and 
development of nuclear technology. As a resu l t, the 
government of North Korea has been unwilling to comp l y with 
UN nuclear weapons proliferation and research reso l utions by 
denying UN atomic energy commission inspectors access to 
their nuc l ear research facility located at Kanggye. 
After months of deliberations, the UN has finally given 
the US permiss ion to conduct limited strike operations 
against North Korean nuc l ear fac i lit i es i f the North Korean 
government does not comply with the UN resolutions. South 
Korea is very concerned about reprisals from the north and 
has elected not to participate in any offensive actions 
against North Korea. 
The Nimitz battlegroup is a l ready in the Sea of Japan 
where i t has just compl eted conducting operations in support 
of Team sp i rit 94 with other al l ied countries. In response, 
North Korea has upgraded its mi litary readiness level and 
p l aced its forces on alert. 
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B . MISSION DESCRIPTION 
The Natio nal Security council (NSC) has ordered the 
Nimitz battle g r o up to plan and conduct an air strike 
against the nuclea r weapons research facil ity located at 
Kanggye due t o the North Korean's non-compliance wi th UN 
r esolutions. Because of the sensitivity of the mission and 
the media a t tent ion that it will generate, a TLAM strike is 
not authorized due to collateral damage from cruise missiles 
that did not reach the target. Addit ionally, the video 
coverage that is provided by aircraft on target wil l further 
support the UN pos i tio n and challenge any false claims by 
the North Korean government about civi l ian casualties and 
e xcessiv e force being levi ed aga inst their country and 
people. 
The US mission is to destroy the North Ko r ean nuclear 
weapons research faci lity at Kanggye. No other offensive 
action shal l be taken against North Korean forces. Hostile 
aircraf t and naval forces may only be engaged if they 
threaten the aircraft strike group or carrier battle group. 
Damage to the North Korean military infrastructure is not 
the mission objective and must be avoided at all costs. 
Consequent ly , no offensive str i kes wi ll be launched against 
these types of t a rg e ts. 
C . RULES OF ENGAGEKENT 
1. General Mission Restrictions: 
US forces available consist of ~ the Nimitz Battle 
group currently located in the Sea of Japan. 
No strikes may originate from South Korea. 
Addi tionally, ~ of South Korea by aircraft is 
strictly ~. 
China has repeatedly warned that it will not tolerate 
any violations of its territorial waters or airspace; 
therefore, overflight of China is prohibited. 
Every attempt should be made to ~ aircraft 
losses; however, the target is classified as high risk 
and must be taken out at all costs. 
The survival of the Nimitz battlegroup is of paramount 
importance and destruction of even one ship is 
unacceptable. 
2. Anti-Air Warfare Intentions: 
Currently two CAP stations are up and manned with a 
section (2) of fighters on each and one E-2C airborne 
and on station providing surveillance for the Nimitz 
battlegroup. This may be modified as desired. 
At the present time, air weapons status is ~ 
~ At no time are US aircraft to allow North Korean 
aircraft to gain an offensive position that would allow 
them to successfully strike the carrier battlegroup. 
A.l.l aircraft will be intercepted and ~ when 
they enter within 150 nm of the Nimitz. Commercial 
aircraft, once identified, do not need to be covered if 
they continue to operate within 150 nm of the Nimitz. 
Military aircraft wil l be covered or escorted if they 
operate wi thin the 150 nm boundary. Once these aircraft 
exit the 150 nm boundary the CAP aircraft will 
discontinue escort duties. 
Aircraft that enter within 100 nm of the Nimitz will be 
engaged only if all of the following occur: 
(a) Aircraft is North Korean 
(b) Aircraft is carrying ordnance 
(c) Attempts to warn off aircraft have been made. 
us aircraft will not engage North Korean aircraft 
operating in international airspace unless these 
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aircraft init i ate hostile actions first o r the 
guidelines o utl i ne d in (4) transpire. 
3. Anti-Surface Warfare Intentions: 
us naval forces must maintain a 12 nautical mile stand-
off from all coastlines. 
Primary area of responsibility (AOR) is 150 nm radius 
around ev. All surface contacts within this AOR will be 
identified and tracked. Any North Korean surface contact 
within 50 nm of the Nimitz will be tracked and monitored 
for hostile intentions. If hostile actions are indicated 
it may be engaged if it closes within 40 nm of the 
Nimi tz. 
For undisclosed reasons the Nimitz battlegroup must 
maintain its current station; therefore, sse missions 
will have to be performed with aircraft. 
Of fensi ve actions directed against North Korean naval 
f orces is prohibited; however, us surface or air assets 
that corne under attack by these naval forces may respond 
i n k i nd. 
The ASUW threat from North Korea is minimal but should 
not be totally discounted. 
Anti-SutJ.arine Warfare Intentions: 
None, no submarine threat. 
5. Air-Strike Rules of Engagell.ent: 
The strike p a c kage (is) will be weapons free enemy air 
once they are over land. During ingress and egress when 
over water the strike packagers) may not engage enemy 
aircraft unless they are being tracked with fire control 
radars. 
The strike objective is the nuclear weapons research 
facility located at Kanggye. The White House wants this 
facility totally obliterated; however, this facility is 
so large that e ven if all the carrier's planes were able 
to drop ordnan c e on it in a single strike, i t would 
still not be enough to totally destroy it . Subsequent 
s trikes wi ll be required; however, the greater the 
amount of ordnance that can be placed on target 
initially the better. 
Strikes against a i r bases and offensive Mi G sweeps are 
not authorized. Defensive MiG sweeps, those that clear 
the i ngress/egress path for the strike group, are 
authorized. SAM sites may be engaged i f they are a 
threat to the str i ke group . 
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APPENDIX H: ORANGE FORCES SCRIPT 
A. ORANGE IS WEAPONS TIGHT UNTIL BLUE INITIATES 
HOSTILITIES. THIS IS DEFINED BY: 
Violating North Korean airspace and/or territorial 
waters. In the game, this occurs when the radar 
defensive perimeter of the detecting base is penetrated. 
Blue aircraft engage any Orange forces. 
If one of these items take place, Orange forces are 
weapons free and wi 11 engage Blue forces according to 
the following script. 
8. MIG PATROLS 
At the start of the game. 3 sorties of J MiG-23 aircraft 
each wi l l depart from Chongjin, songjin and Wanson. These 
airc raft will close the carrier battle group but not close 
to within 100 nm of the carr ier. The following routes of 
flight are designed t o test carrier CAP aircraft and provide 
the player with additional tasks. 
C. ORANGE FIGHTER AIRCRAFT WILL SCRAMBLE FROM THEIR 
RESPECTIVE BASES BASED UPON THE FOLLOWING ALGORITHM: 
(a) When the Blue strike penetrates the Orange radar 
detection bubble for a base, 1/2 of the available fighters 
will scramble (from that base) to intercept the incoming 
strike group . 
(b) The second breach of a airbase defense zone (by a 
different strike group) will result in Orange scrambling 
the other 1/2 of their fighters. 
(c) Orange fighter aircraft (those already airborne and 
those scrambled) will intercept and engage the incoming 
Blue aircraft. 
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(d) The Orange fighters will continue to pursue and engage 
the attacking Blue aircraft until one of the fOllowing 
1. All attacking Blue aircraft are destroyed. 
2. All intercepting Orange aircraft are destroyed. 
3. Orange aircraft must RTB for fuel/ordnance. 
The Blue aircraft are retreating and close to within 
100 nrn of the carrier. 
(e) When the Blue strike group penetrates the 50 nm 
perimeter around Kanggye, Orange interceptors will 
scramble out of Sinuiju based upon the 1/2 aircraft 
algorithm. 
(f) NOTE: When a base scrambles aircraft to intercept a 
strike group that breaks its perimeter, the aircraft 
launched will continue the pursuit as outlined above; 
however, the base will not launch another intercept group 
against the same strike group if it again breaks its 
defensive bubble. For example, the Hamhung defensive 
border is v i olated by an ingressing strike. Aircraft are 
launched and pursue the strike group. After the attacking 
aircraft strike Kanggye they egress back through the 
Hamhung defensive zone. This time Hamhung will not launch 
additional interceptors because these bogeys are already 
engaged. 
O. WEAPONS FREE FOR "IG PATROLS 
The Orange MiG patrols that are launched at game start 
will proceed on their routes until completion and then land . 
However, if they are airborne and a radar bubble is broken 
by the Blue strike group, they will pursue and engage the 
striking Blue aircraft. Aircraft scrambles from the airbases 
will be as defined above. 
E. ORANGE STRIKE PLAN 
The Orange strike force wil l launch as soon as the Blue 
strike group is over Kanggye. The strike force wil l consist 
of the following: 
4 MiG-29 and 5 Badger aircraft launched from Chongjin 
will compose the north strike force. 
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5 Badgers will launch from Pyongyang and will rendezvous 
over Harnhung with 4 MiG-29 aircraft launched from 
Wanson. 
4 MiG-29 and 5 Badger aircraft launched from Wan son will 
compose the south str i ke force. 
These strike groups will proceed a l ong their routes and 
attack the carrier batt legroup once they reach maximum 
weapons re l ease range ( 80 om) and then return home. They 
wil l not break off the attack until their weapons have been 
released or they have been destroyed. The sale purpose of 
the fighter escort is to get the bombers to the weapons 
re l ease point and back home again; therefore, the Orange 
f i g h t er escort will not engage the egressing Blue strike 
group but ~ Blue CAP aircraft that attempt to 
intercept the Orange strike package. They will continue to 
pro vide cover for the bombers after the weapons have been 
r eleased so that the bombers wil l have a chance to return to 
base . The fighter escort will not be weapons free unti l the 
package is 100 nm from the Nimitz or unless the package is 
attack ed earlier by Blue forces. 
F. ORANGE SURFACE UNIT AAW POSTURE 
Orange naval forces wi ll launch SA-7 weapons if Blue 
a i rcraft fly wi thin range and al ti tude. 
G . ORANGE SHORE BA1"l'ERIRS 
Orange shore batteries and remote SAM sites initial l y 
wi ll not be active; however, as soon as an airbase defensive 
perimeter is transgressed these sites will become active and 
att ack any Blue aircraft within range. Bl ue aircraft may 
a ttack these sites if they pose a direct threat to the 
Kanggye strike group (i. e., they are on an i ngress/egress 
route) . 
NORTH KOREA ORDER OF BATTLE 
Chonqji n 
5 Badge rs (2 AS -5 Kitchen) 
>:, MiG- 29 ( 6 M-1 0 , 30 mm g un) 
10 MiG 23 ( 2 AA-7 , 23 mm gun) 
2 511.- 2 and 2 511.-3 SAM sites 
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2. songjin 
10 MiG 29 (6 AA-10, 30 mID gun) 
15 MiG 23 (2 AA-7, 23 mID gun) 
10 MiG 21 (2 AA-2, 2 AA-B, 23 mm gun) 
2 SA-3 SAM sites 
Hamhung 
10 MiG 19 (Sidewinders, 2 30 rom guns) 
10 MiG 23 (2 AA-7, 23 mID gun) 
10 MiG 21 (2 AA-2, 2 AA-a, 23 rom gun) 
2 SA-2 and 2 SA-3 SAM Sites 
Wonson 
10 Badgers (2 AS-5 Kitchen) 
10 MiG 29 ( 6 AA-10, 30 mm gun) 
1 5 MiG 23 (2 AA-7, 23 mm gun) 
3 SA-2 and 1 SA-3 SAM sites 
Pyongyang 
10 Badgers (2 AS-5 Kitchen) 
10 MiG 29 (6 AA- I 0, 30 mm gun) 
20 MiG 23 (2 AA-7, 23 nun gun) 
20 MiG 21 (2 AA-2, 2 AA-B, 23 rom gun) 
10 MiG 19 ( rockets, 2 30 mm guns ) 
4 SA-2, 4 SA-3 and 4 SA-5 SAM sites 
6. Sinuiju 
40 MiG 21 ( 2 AA-2, 2 AA-a, 23 mm gun) 
3 SA-2 SAM sites 
Kanggye (TARGET) 
3 SA- 2 and 2 SA-3 SAM Sites 
2 ZSU-23 AM sites 
a. No subw.arines (Blue or Orange) . 
North Korean naval forces and neutral fishing 
vessels located in various locations in the Sea of Japan 
and Yellow Sea. 
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10 . North Korean shore batteries scattered along coast 
and specific inland sites. These batteries contain SA-2, 
SA-3, SA-7 and ZSU-23 components. 
11. Aircraft train i ng flights at g~e start: 
a. Flight of 3 MiG 23's from Chongjin. 
b. Flight of 3 MiG 23's fro. Songjin. 
c. Flight of 3 MiG 23's from Wanson . 
APPENDIX I: INTELLIGENCE UPDATE PROCEDURES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The primary premise of this thesis is to assess what 
different levels of information have upon tactical decision-
making with regards to offensive strike capability and 
defensive posture of a carrier batt l egroup. To accompl ish a 
test of this hypothesis it was decided to give the commander 
( the player) an in i tia l intell i gence brief based on the 
degree of reso lution for that particular run of the game, 
and then supply the player wi th updates of the tactical 
situation at three d iscrete places in the game, those 
updates also being of the same resolution of the initial 
intel brief. The three times chosen for the information to 
be passed to the commander are as follows: 
1. First Update Message 
This message is given to the player upon initial 
detection of the Blue Strike Group by Orange Forces. These 
messages will supply the player with enemy air activity, and 
the information content and flow will depend upon the 
resolution of the part i cular run . Th i s would be the first 
critical decision point in the game and would give the Blue 
player the opportunity to vary tact ics such as ingress 
routes and strike defensive posture. 
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2. Second Update Message 
The sec ond information update was given when the 
s lue Strike Group cl osed wi t hin 50 miles of the target. 
This gives t he player a chance to make decisions with regard 
to carrier defense and the most efficient way to recover the 
i nbo und Blue Strike Package upon their return. 
J. Third Update MeSS8ge 
The third upda te consisted of current information 
concerning enemy reaction when the initial Blue aircraft 
reached the target area. This information was critical for 
determining the best e gress route for the strike package and 
also for helping the c ommander with the defensive posture of 
his forces. 
B. KESSAGE UPDATES 
1. Very Low Intelligence, First Update Messa g e 
XX0015ZFEB94 
FM CTF 77 
TO CTG 7 7.1 
SUBJ: KOREAN THEATER INTELLIGENCE UPDATE REPORT (VL-l ) 
1. The North Korean Air defense Contro l center located at 
:;de::-;t:::e-::-ct"i-=o::-n-:o:'-f -:-:un~~:n~~~~e~C!i;~;:~t i~h~~s~~~::r t~o tg: a 
threat to North Korea. Air-search radars located at 
_____ have detected the threat. 
2. various SAM battery aquisition radars have been 
acti vated; locations unknown. 
3. Increased communications acti vi ty between Hamhung and 
various bases in North Korea. Standby for further updates. 
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2. Very Low Intelligence, Second Update Message 
VL 
XX0015ZFEB94 
FM CTF 77 
TO CTG 77.1 
SUBJ: KOREAN THEATER INTELLIGENCE UPDATE REPORT (VL-2) 
1. Increased air activity at Sinuiju has been observed. 
2. Numerous SAM sites have been activated; Kanggye is known 
to be act i ve. 
3. communications between Hamhung, Chongjin, Wonson and 
Pyongyang concerning alert aircraft status. 
3. Very Low Intelligence, Third Update Message 
VL 
XX0015ZFEB94 
FM CTF 77 
TO CTG 77.1 
SUBJ: KOREAN THEATER INTELLIGENCE UPDATE REPORT (VL-3) 
1. Aircraft have been launched from chongjin, Hamhung and 
Wanson. The type, number of aircraft and course is unknown. 
2. All SAM sites are active and weapons free. 
4. Low Resolution Intelligence, First Update Message 
FM CTF 77 
TO CTG 77.1 
SUBJ: KOREAN THEATER INTELLIGENCE UPDATE REPORT (L-1) 
The North Korean Air defense Control Center located at 
~de:C;t:Ce-:Cct"i-Co=-n-'o-of--"un7~:n~~~7e~c;i;~~:~t i~h~~s;~~~:r t~o t~: a 
threat to North Korea. Air-search radars located at 
"be;;::g;Cu=-n.tC;;o-'''a'''u=nch h~r~h~:~e~;~~r~~~. threat and the base has 
~~t;~~;d ~AM emissions in the ____ _ area have been 
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J . Increased communications activity ~rom Hamhung to 
se lect e d bases in North Korea. Intell~gence reports that 
Hamhung has released an order concerning plan "B" execution. 
Conte nts of this message are unknown at this time. Standby 
f o r further updates. 
5. LoW' Resolution Intelligence, Second Update Message 
L 
FM CTF 77 
TO CTG 77 . 1 
SUBJ: KOREAN THEATER INTELLIGENCE UPDATE REPORT ( L-2) 
1. S inui j u is l aunching numerous aircraft. The type, number 
o f aircraft and course is unknown. 
2. SA-2 and SA-] emissions in the Kanggye area have been 
detected. SA-5 emissions in the Pyongyang area have been 
detected and all other SAM sites are suspected to be active. 
J . communications between Hamhung, Chongjin, Won son and 
Pyongyang concerning aircraft rendezvous positions have been 
intercepted. 
6. Low Resolution Intelligence, Third Update Message 
L 
FM CTF 77 
TO CTG 77.1 
SUBJ: KOREAN THEATER INTELLIGENCE UPDATE REPORT ( L-)) 
1. Three flights of aircraft have been launched from 
Chongjin, Hamhung and Wonson. The type and number of 
aircraft is unknown; however, they do not appear to be 
headed for Kanggye. 
2. All SAM sites in North Korea are active and weapons free. 
7. MediUll Resolution Intelligence, First Update Kessage 
XX0015Z FEB94 
PM CTF 77 
TO CTG 77. 1 
SUBJ: KOREAN THEATER INTELLIGENCE UPDATE REPORT (M-1) 
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The North Korean Air defense Control Center located at 
~de-t-e-ct~i-o-n -o~f-un~~:n~~~~e~c~t;~;:~t i~h~~S~~~!:r t~o tg: a 
threat to North Korea. Air-search radars located at 
-a1~r-ea-d'-Y~1CCa-'-un'"'c7he~av_e_de_t_ec~~~h~~~ ~~~~~~f~n~n~h~s b~~~t~~~ing 
to launch more aircraft. 
2. SA-2 and SA-3 SAM emissions in the _____ and 
Kanggye area have been detected. 
3. Increased communications activity from Hamhung to 
Chongjin, Wonson and Pyongyang. Intel ligence reports that 
Hamhung has released an order concerning Badger and MiG 
rendezvous positions. Contents of this message are unknown 
at this time. Standby for further updates. 
8. MediUlll Resolution Intelligence, Second Update 
Message 
XX0015ZFEB94 
FM CTF 77 
TO CTG 77 .1 
SUBJ: KOREAN THEATER INTELLIGENCE UPDATE REPORT (M-2) 
1. Sinu i ju is launching numerous MiG-21 aircraft. Ten have 
already taken off and more are launching. The destination 
and mission of the aircraft i s unknown but the aircraft are 
headed northeast. 
2. All SAM sites in North Korea are active and weapons free. 
3 . Communicat i ons between Hamhung, chongj in, Won son and 
Pyongyang have been intercepted. Contents include Badger a nd 
MiG rendezvous positions and flight routes. 
9. Medium Resolution Intel l igence, Third Update Message 
M 
XX0015ZFEB94 
FM CTF 77 
TO CTG 77.1 
SUBJ : KOREAN THEATER INTELLI GENCE UPDATE REPORT (M-3) 
1. Three f l ights of Badger and MiG-29 aircraft have been 
launched from Chong j in, Hamhung and Wonson. The exact number 
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of each aircraf t i s unknown. The Badgers are believed to be 
l oaded with 1'.5-5 Kelt missiles. These f l ights appear to be 
headed out to sea. 
10. High Resolution Intelligence, First Update Message 
H 
FM CTF 77 
TO CTG 77.1 
SUBJ: KOREAN THEATER INTELLIGENCE UPDATE REPORT (H-1) 
1 . T"he No rth Korean Air defense Control Center located at 
~de"tC-:e-:Cct:-;i-'-on::-:o-'-f--::un~~:n~~~~e~C!i~~;:~t i~h~~S~~~::r t~o tg: a 
threa t to North Korea. Air-search radars located at 
1a :Cu:::n::;ch"i""ng:-_ -___ h_av~ i~~~:~t:fr;~:f~h~~a{n~~~c!~~ ~~~e e~~age 
the threat. 
2 . SAM bases throughout the country have been activated and 
all h ave received a weapons free order and will engage any 
enemy ai rc raft wi thin range. 
) . Increased communications activity from Hamhung to 
Chongjin. Wonson and Pyongyang. Intelligence reports that 
Hamhung has released an order concerning Badger and MiG 
rendezvous positions for the upcoming retaliatory action 
against the U.S. forces. 
11. High Resolution Intelligence, Second Update Message 
H 
FM CTF 77 
TO CTG 77.l 
SUBJ; KOREAN THEATER INTELLIGENCE UPDATE REPORT (H-2) 
1. S i nuiju is laUnching 20 MiG-21 aircraft. These aircraft 
are headed for Kanggye to engage the U.S. strike package 
enroute. 
12. High Resolution Intelligence, Third Update Message 
H 
FM CTF 77 
TO CTG 77.1 
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SUBJ: KOREAN THEATER INTELLIGENCE UPDATE REPORT (H-3) 
1 . Three flights of 5 Badger and 4 HiG-29 aircraft have 
been launched from chongjin, Hamhung and Wonson. The Badgers 
are loaded with 3 AS-5 Kelt missiles per aircraft. These 
flights appear to be headed for the U.S. carrier task force 
in retaliation for the U.S. strike against North Korea. 
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APPENDIX J: PUYER DEBRIEF 
Name: _______ Resolution: 
2. Mission Planning: 
(a) Why did you c hoose the strike ingress route that you 
did? What factors influenced your decision? 
( b) How did you determine the number and type of 
a ircraft that y ou util ized in your strike package? 
What factors influenced your decision? 
(c) Why did you choose the strike egress route that you 
did? What factors influenced your decision? 
(d) was the initial intelligence brief he l pful in 
planning the str i k e package composition and CV 
defensive posture? 
(e ) Were the i ntel lig ence updates helpful in mOdifying 
your strike p l an and/or defending the task force? If 
yes, how was the informa tion useful? 
). Inte l ligence Data: 
( a ) what i tems in the initial brief were the most 
helpful in assessing the si tuation. Rank the 
following items from most important to least : 
) Aircraft d ata: number/type 
) SAM data: type/location 
) Logistics data: urgency/contents 
) Communications traffic : contents/density 
) Enemy air surveillance data: 
l ocations/ranges 
) Defense Strategy 
(b) Was there any type of information, not included i n 
the initial brief, that would have influenced the way you 
formulated your initial strategy and plans? 
APPENDIX K: ENGAGEMENT LOG 
A. SUMMARY OF AIRCRAFT LOST 
FIRING DAMAGED 
TIME TARGET WEAPON PLATFORM 
BASE/SHIP 
020128Z VF203 M7 FL404 
020130Z FL404 SWDR VF224 
020130Z FL405 SWDR VF224 
020130Z VQ200 M7 FL400 
020130Z VF202 M7 FL404 
020131Z FU401 SPAR VF224 
020131Z FL403 PHENX VF204 
020132Z VF224 MIO FU400 
020132Z VF225 MIO FU400 
FU400 SWDR VF224 
020133Z FL400 SPAR VF228 
020133Z FL401 SPAR VF228 
020134Z VF204 SA' SA202 
020135Z FL402 SPAR VF205 
020136Z V),204 SAS PYONG 
020140Z FL500 SWDR VF228 
020140Z VA207 M7 FL500 
020141Z VA205 M7 FL501 
020143Z FL501 SPAR VF228 
020146Z VA200 SA' SA202 
020148Z VF236 SA' SA201 
020148Z VQ203 SA' SA202 
020149Z VF205 MIO FU402 
020150Z VF232 SA' SA201 
020152Z VF234 MIO FU404 
020152Z VF235 MIO FU404 
020153Z VF230 MIO FU404 
020154Z VF231 MIO FU404 
020156Z VA.206 SA' SA201 
020206Z VF206 MlO FU300 
020206Z VF207 MlO FU300 
020215Z FU205 SWOR VF200 
020215Z FU206 SWDR VF200 
etc. 
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B. L] ST OF ALL ENGAGEMENTS 
TIME PLATFORM WEAPON TRACK TARGET RESULT RANGE MBURANGE 
02011 BZ SOHO GIOOl OA013 VQ20) M( 1) 6 191 
02011 8Z SA201 SA2 OA007 VF224 1'1 (20) 7 201 
02 0119Z SOHO GIOOI OA013 VQ20) M( 1) 6 196 
020 1 2 0Z SA201 SA2 OM10 VF232 1'1 (20) 6 214 
020 1 22 Z SA20 2 SA2 OA007 VF224 1'1 (20 ) 22 227 
0201 24Z PYONG SA5 OMI) VQ20) 1'1 (25) 126 231 
020124 Z SA202 SA2 OA0 08 VF202 H (20) 6 240 
020124Z SA20 3 SA2 OA008 VF202 1'1 (20) 23 240 
020126Z SA20 2 SA2 OMlO VF232 1'1 (20) 5 254 
0201 26 Z SA20) SA 2 OAOI0 VF232 1'1 (20) 19 254 
0 2 0127Z PYONG SA5 OA016 VF230 1'1 (25) 117 251 
02 01 28 Z FL404 AA7 OA008 VF202 1'1 (60) 19 267 
02 0 1 28Z FU04 AA7 OA008 VF202 H 19 267 
020128Z SPLASH ENGAGE VF20J H 0 0 
0201 29Z FL404 AA 7 OA008 VF202 1'1 (60) 14 27) 
020130Z VF2 24 SWOR BA200 FL404 H 270 
OlOlJO Z SPLASH ENGAGE FL404 H 
020130Z VE"224 SWOR 8A200 FL404 270 
OlO1 3 0Z SPLASH ENGAGE FL405 0 
OlO130Z VF204 PHENX BA200 FL404 J7 270 
020lJOZ VF204 PHENX BA200 FL404 )7 270 
0 20130Z VF228 SWDR BA200 FL404 H 9 270 
020130Z VF228 SWDR BA200 FL404 H {50) 9 270 
0201 30Z VF232 SWDR BA200 FL404 H 9 270 
020130Z VF232 SWDR BA200 FL404 H 9 270 
020130Z VF236 SWDR BA200 FL404 H{ 50) 9 270 
020130 Z VF236 SWDR BA200 FL404 M{50) 9 270 
020130Z FL 400 AA7 OA006 VQ200 H 20 279 
0 20130Z SPLASH ENGAGE VQ200 H 0 0 
020130Z FL402 AA7 OA006 VQ200 H 16 279 
020130Z FL404 AA7 OA008 VF202 H 16 265 
020130Z SPLASH ENGAGE VF202 H 0 0 
020131Z VF224 SPAR BA255 FU400 M{65) 23 270 
0 20131Z VF224 SPAR BA255 FU400 H 23 270 
020131Z SPLASH ENGAGE FU401 H 0 0 
020131Z VF204 PHENX 8A255 FL402 M{70) 46 256 
020131Z VF204 PHENX 8A255 FL402 H 46 256 
02 01 31 Z SPLASH ENGAGE FL40) H 0 0 
020131Z VF228 SPAR 8A255 FU400 H (65) 23 270 
020 131Z VF228 SPAR 8A255 FU400 H 23 2 70 
020132Z KANG' SA 2 OAOI0 VF232 M{20) 22 2 97 
etc. 
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APPENDIX L: DATA TABULATION TABLE 
RESOLUTION· 
strike Package information: 
- Number of packages: __ 
- Support Package(s): __ 
- composition: 
STK A-6E: _ _ FjA-18(B) : _ _ EA-6B: __ 
SUP F-14: _ _ F/A-18 (E) : _ _ other: __ VW/KAjVS 
STK A-6E: __ Fj A-18 (B) : __ EA-6B: _ _ 
SUP F-14 : __ F /A-18 (E) : _ _ other:__ VWjKAjVS 
STK A-6E: _ _ F/A-18(B ) : _ _ EA-6B: _ _ 
SUP F-1 4: _ _ FjA-18(E) : __ Other: __ VWjKA/VS 
STK A- 6 E: _ _ FjA-18(B) : _ _ EA-6B: __ 
SUP F-14: _ _ FjA-18(E): _ _ Other: _ _ VW/KA/VS 
Notes: 
CAP Package infonaation 
- Composition : 
CAP F-14: _ _ FjA-18: _ _ 
SUP E-2C: _ _ TANKER: __ S-J: 
I ngress (Target I Qsses 
EA-6B: 
Air/SAM Air/sAM Air/SAM Air 
strike EscortStrk sup NK 
Egres s I PUes 
Air/SAM Air/SAM Air/SAM Air 
Strike EscortStrk Sup NK 
Red Str j ke Losses 
TU-16 MiG-29 us CAP Def Sup 
TU-16 Lnchng Miss: Missile s IlIIpacting: 
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/I strik e Launched: II NK Fght Lost During Ingress: 
/I Escor t Launched: I NK Fght Lost Dur i ng Egress: 
/I St kSup Launched : II NK Escort Lost During strike: 
II Str i ke Reaching Ta rget: II NK Badgers Lost During Strike: 
I Escort Reach i ng Target: II NK Badgers Launching Missiles: 
II stkSup Reaching Target: 
II St r ike Lost During Egress: 
II Escort Lost Duri ng Egress: 
II St kSup Lost During Egress: 
II CAP Lost During NK strike: 
# DefSup Lost During NK stk: 
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APPENDIX M: ANALYSIS 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON the ~ of Strike Aircraft that reach the 
Target from BQ!;11 co_unities based on Warfare Specialty. 
SOURCE DF SS 
War Spec 1 1.0 
ERROR 22 1372.6 
TOTAL 23 1373.6 
LEVEL N MEAN 
0 12 18.583 
1 12 18.167 







INDIVIDUAL 95% CI'S FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 
STDEV ------+---------+---------+---------+ 9. 040 ( _______________ 1r _______________ ) 
6.562 ( _______________ 1r ______________ ) 
------+---------+---------+---------+ 
15.0 18.0 21.0 24.0 
B. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON the ~ of Strike Aircraft that reach the 






























INDIVIDUAL 95% CI' S FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 
STDEV ------+---------+---------+---------... 7.916 ( __________ 1r __________ ) 
7.916 ( __________ 1r __________ ) 
9.482 ( ___________ 1r __________ ) 
( __________ 1r __________ ) 
------+---------+---------+---------+ 
12.0 18.0 24.0 30.0 
C. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON the ~ of Strike Aircraft from the TKM.B. 
co_unity that reach the Target based on .emu: Information Levels. 
SOURCE DF SS 
Level 72 
ERROR 827 
TOTAL 11 899 
LEVEL MEAN 












INDIVIDUAL 95% CI'S FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 
STDEV ------- --+------- --+---------+-------7.94 ( _____________ 1r _____________ ) 
( _____________ 1r ____________ ) 
1 3.05 ( _____________ 1r ____________ ) 
6.93 ( _____________ 1r _____________ ) 
---------+---------+---------+-------
10 20 30 
D. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON the Nuaber of Strike Aircraft from the 'N!Jll 











181 . 7 
2 92 . 0 
4 73 . 7 
1 2. 667 
1 7.0 0 0 












INDIVIDUAL 95 % CI'S FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 
- ----+---------------- ---+----- --- -+-(---------*--------- ) 
(---------*--------- ) (---------*--------- ) 
-----+----:====:====:=========~------
POOLED STDEV '" 6.042 8.0 16.0 24.0 32.0 
B. MEAN VALUE DIFFEIU:NTIAL AlfALYSIS ON the ~ of Strike Aircraft 
reaching the Target: Em.u:. Infor:Jllation Levels. 
~~""d .Me." 18 . )·I ~ 
-~--- . -~-L::],aC-A1 J: . Corrblne d NUH ·~-ac-Air 
l U.5 A] 18 .H7 
--- --
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ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON the ~ of strike Aircraft that reach the 





















INDIVIDUAL 95% CI' S FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STOEV 
STOEV ------+-------- -+- ------ - - +- --------+ 
7.709 ( - -----------*------------) 7.763 ( ____________ 1r ____________ ) 
------+---------+---------+---------+ 
14.0 17.5 21.0 24.5 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON the ~ of Strike Aircraft that reach the 
Target from the ~ co_unity based on .ntQ: Information LevelS. 
ANALYSIS OF VAR IANC E ON stk TGT 
SOURCE DF 55 HS F 
0.01 
P 
0.929 Level 1 0.8 0.8 
ERROR 10 898.2 




POOLED STDEV '" 9.477 
INDIVIDUAL 95% el'S FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 
STDEV -+---------+-------- - +---------+-----8.886 ( _________________ 1r ________ _ _______ ) 
10 .0)) ( _________________ 1r ________________ ) 
-+---------+---------+---------+-----
10 .0 15.0 20.0 25.0 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON the &.I.ILt!e.r. of strike Aircraft that reach t he 
Target from the ~ co_unity based on .niQ Information Levels. 
SOURCE OF 



















INDIVIDUAL 95% CI' S FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 
STDEV - +---------+---------+---------+-----6.494 ( __________ 1r _________ ) 
5.089 ( _ _________ 1r __________ ) 
-+---------+---------+---------+-----
10.0 15 .0 20.0 25.0 
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I. MEAN VALUE DIFFERENTIAL ANALYSIS ON the ~ of Strike Aircraft 
reaching the Target : XJ!Q Information Levels. 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON the ~ of Strike Aircraft that reach the 
Target from J82..t.h cOllllluni ties based on Warfare Specialty. 
SOURCE OF 


















INDIVIDUAL 95% CI'S FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 
STDEV - ------+---------+---------+---------
0.1588 (----------*----------- ) 
0.2200 ( ----------*-----------) 
-------+-------- -+-- ------ -+---- - ----
0.70 0 . 80 0.90 
K . ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON the ~ of strike Aircraft that reach the 

















0.9 14 1 
0 .7604 
0 . 7436 
0. 9593 
0 .192 5 
MS 
0 . 0578 
0 . 0370 
STDEV 
0.2634 







INDIVIDUAL 95% CI' S FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 
--+---------+---------+---------+----(----------*---------- ) (----------*---------- ) (----------*---------- ) ( ----------*---------- ) 
--+---------+---------+---------+-- --
0.60 0.75 0.90 1.05 
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L. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON the ~ of strike Aircraft that reac h the 
































INDIVIDUAL 95%: CI' S FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 
- +---------+---------+---------+-----
(-----------*---------- ) (----------*---------- ) (----------*----------- ) 
(-----------*---------- ) 
- +---- -----+---------+---------+--- - -
0.60 0.80 1.00 1.20 
M. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON the ~ of Strike Aircraft that reach 



































INDI VI DUAL 95% cr's FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 
------+---------+----- --- - +---------+ (-----------*---------- ) 
(-----------*---------- ) (----------*----------- ) (-----------*---------- ) 
------+---------+---------+---------+ 
0.50 0.75 1.00 1. 2 5 
MEAN VALUE DIFFERENTIAL ANALYSIS ON the ~ of strike Aircraft 
reaching the Target: l'mu:: Information Levels . 
I ::";,: I 
~
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O. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON the ~ of strike Aircraft that reach the 
Target fro. lklth co_unities based on XIfQ Infor:Jll.ation Levels. 
SOURCE SS 
Lev e l 0.10 6 2 
ERROR 22 0 .8079 







INDIV IDUAL 95% CI' S FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 
LEVEL N HEAN STDEV --- ----+----- ----... -- -------+ ______ __ _ 
0 12 0.7520 
0.2395 ( __________ 11' ___________ ) 
12 0.8850 
POOL ED STDEV '" 
(-----------.---------- ) 
-------+---------+---------+-------- -
0.70 0.80 0.90 
P . ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON the ~ of strike Aircraft that reach the 
Target frOID the ~ co_unity based on ntQ Inforastion Levels. 
SOURCE OF 






pOOLED STDEV = 
SS HS 
0.0152 










I NDIVIDUAL 95% CI' S FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 
----------+-------------------+------(----------- ---*-------------- ) 
------_:==:=========:=:=======:====== ) 
0.80 0.90 1.00 
Q . ANALYS IS OF VARIANCE ON the ~ of Strike Aircraft that reach the 
Target from the ~ co_unity based on XIfiz Information Levels. 
ANALYSI S OF VARIANCE ON %Stk. TGT 
SOURCE OF SS MS 
Le v e l 0 . 1140 0.1140 
ERROR 10 0 .4 183 0.0418 




POOLED STDEV = 0.2045 
p 
0.130 
INDIVIDUAL 95% CI' S FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 
-+---------+---------- --- ------+---- -(-----------*----------- ) (-----------*----------- ) 
-+---------+- - - - -----+---------+-----
0.48 0.64 0.80 0.96 
135 
R. MEAN VALUE DIFFERENTIAL ANALYSIS ON the ~ of strike Aircraft 




I Leve l 1 I 




S. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE Olf t he ~ of strike Aircraft reaching t he 




























INDIVIDUAL 95%: CI'S FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 
-----+---------+---- -----+---------+-(-----*----- ) (---*--- ) (--------------_.--------------- ) 
-----+---------+---------+---------+-
o 10 20 )0 
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T. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON the ~ of Strike Packages launched based 
on the Warfare Specialty. 
SOURCE OF 
























0 . 06 2 
INDIVIDUAL 95%: CI I 5 FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 
- +---------+---------+--- ------+ -- -- -(--- ------*--------- ) (---------*--------- ) 
- +---------+---------+---------+-----
1 . 20 1 . 50 1 . 80 2 . 10 
U. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON the ~ of Strike Packages launched based 













POOLED STDEV = 
55 
1 .4 58 




2 . 0000 
1.) ))) 
1.6667 
0 . 5 244 
H5 
0. 486 










INDIVIDUAL 9 5 \ CI ' 5 FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 
---+---------+---------+---------+- --( ________ 0 ________ ) 
(--------*-------- ) (--------*-------- ) ( --------*-------- ) 
---+---------+---------+---------+---
1.00 1.50 2 .00 2 . 50 
V. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON the lflI..ab§r. of strike Packages launched based 







POOLED STDEV = 
55 
1 . 000 
2 .000 
3 . 000 
MEAN 
1 . 6667 
1 . 6667 
1.0000 
1.6667 
0 . 5000 
H5 
O . D3 
0. 250 
STDEV 
0 . 5774 




1.33 O . DO 
INDIVIDUAL 95% CI' S FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 
-----+---- -----+-- -------+---- -----+-(----------*---------- ) (----------*---------- ) (----------*---------- ) (----------*---------- ) 
--- --+----- ----+------ ---+- - -------+-
0 . 60 1.20 1.80 2 .40 
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ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON the ~ of Strike Aircraft reaching the 
























INDIVIDUAL 95% CI' S FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 
STDEV ---- --+--- - -----+---------+--------- + 9.445 ( _____________ It ______ _ _______ ) 
9.261 ( ______________ It _____________ J 
------+---------+---------+---------+ 
12 .0 18 .0 24.0 30.0 
X. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON the ~ of strike Packages launched based 































INDIVIDUAL 95% CI'S FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 
----+---------+- --------+----------.---(----------*---------- ) (----------*---------- ) (----------*---------- ) ( ________ _ _ It _ _ ________ ) 
----+---------+---------+---------+--
1.20 1.80 2.40 3.00 
Y. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON the ~ of Strike Aircraft reaching the 
Target based on the ~ of Strike Packages launched; ~
co_unity. 
SOURCE DF 55 
StrkPack 2 122 .9 
ERROR 9 350.7 













INDIVIDUAL 95% CI' 5 FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 
STDEV ---+---------+---------+---------+---4.950 ( _________ It ________ ) 
6.386 ( ___ It ____ J 
O. 000 ( _____________ It _____________ ) 
10 20 30 
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Z. l!Jl.IIHB OF STRIKE AIRCRAFT reaching Target based on the ~ of 
stri ke Pac k ages launched: lk2th co_unities. 
""'-
''-' 
Hl.lI!f.aBB OF strike Aircraft launched based on the Warfare Specialty and 
Information Level: l12t.h co_unities • 
Me.n Number of StI'tb PtIC~ 
2.' 






I!IBlJl. lRl.lUiBB OF Strike Packages launched and UM I.f.fJlf.1iBE. OF Strike 
Aircraft reaching Target based on l:aIU:: Infor-ation Levels: ~
co_unity. 
";""UII'~~ ,~ ::-Ij. 1.5 20 111ef 
" , ' 
" 0.' . 
o 0 1 2 3 0, 2 
tmrorno.Ion ~ SdlehckaIIM 
If.BM. ~ OF Strike Packages launched and II.BM. lfJ.lJfHB. OF Strike 
Aircraft reac hing Target based on emu: Infor.ation Levels : IlJ2D. x.&::A.IB 
co_unity_ 
~iI'- ., 2.5:us:! 2!i 24.S 
" ,~,- "'w'·w 1.5 IS 
, " 
0.5 . 5 
o 0 1 2. 3 0 1 2 3 
~l"'" ""'PKbgM 
AD. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON the ~ of Strike Aircraft reaching t h e 
Target based on the ~ of Strike Packages l aunched. l!Q.th 
communities. 
SOURC E OF 
St rkPack 2 






POOL ED STOEV -= 
55 
117 . 4 
1 25 6 . :2 
137) .6 
HEAN 
21. 1 25 
17 . )33 
1 2. 0 00 
7. 73 4 
H5 
58 . 7 
STOEV 
8. 4 59 
7 . 345 
F 
0 . 98 
p 
0.391 
INDI VIDUAL 95% CI' S FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STOEV 
-----+---------+----- - ---+----- ----+-( _____ 1r ___ __ ) 
( ---* -- - ) ( _______________ 1r __ __ _____ ___ ___ ) 
-----+---------+---------+---------+-
o 1 0 20 )0 
AB . ANALYSIS Of' VARIANCE ON the ~ af Strike Packages launched. based 
on the Warfare Specialty. l!Q.th co_unities. 
SOURCE OF 






POOLED STOEV -= 
55 
1. 042 





0. 518 6 
H5 
1. 042 








INDIVI DUAL 95\ CI'S FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 
-+---------+---------+---- -----+-----(---------*--------- ) (------- --*--------- ) 
- +--------- +- -------- +------ ---+-----
1.20 1.50 1.80 2.10 
AF. ANALY SIS Of' VARIANCE ON the ~ of strike Packages launched based 
on TJ(Q I nformation Levels. 1!2th co_unities . 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON StrkPack 
SOURCE OF SS MS 
Level 1 1.042 1.042 
ERROR 22 5 .91 7 0.269 






POOLED STDEV ~ 
MEAN 
1 .9 167 
1 . 5000 
STOEV 
0. 5 149 




0 . 062 
I NDIVIDUAL 95% C I ' S FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 
- +---------+---------+---------+-----( --------- *--------- ) (---------*--------- ) 
- +---------+---------+---------+-----
1.20 1.50 1.80 2 . 10 
141 
AG. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON the ~ of Strike Packages launched based 
on ~ Inforaation Levels. co_unity. 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON StrkPack 
SOURCE DF SS MS p 
0.290 Level 1 0.333 0.333 
ERROR 10 2.667 0.267 






POOLED S'IDEV = 0.5164 
INDIVIDUAL 95% CI' S FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 
STDEV ------+---------+------ - --+---------+ 
0.5164 (-------------*------------) 
0.5164 (------------*------------- ) 
------... ---------+---------+---------+ 
1. 05 1. 40 1. 75 2.10 
AH. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON the llI.i~ of Strike Aircraft reaching the 
Target based on the llYab§.!: of Strike Packages launched. ~ 
Inforaation Levels. '1'ACME. co_unity. 
SOURCE OF SS 
StrkPack 
ERROR 10 874.8 




POOLED STDEV = 9.353 
24.1 




INDIVIDUAL 95% CI' S FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 





AI. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON the ~ of Strike Packages launched based 
















2. 1 667 
1.6667 











INDIVIDUAL 95% CI' 5 FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 
---------+---------+---------+-------( ---------*---------- ) (----------*--------- ) 
---------+---------+---------+-------
1. 60 2.00 2.40 
142 
AJ _ ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON the ~ of Strike Aircraft reaching the 
Ta rget based on the ~ of Strike Packages l a unched. !l'J!Q 
Inf or-ation Levels. N!JIl XN.:AI.B. co_unity. 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON Stk TGT 
SOURCE OF 55 MS F p 
0.259 StrkPac k 2 122.9 61.5 1. 58 
ERROR 9 350. 7 39.0 





POOLED STDEV '" 6.24 3 
INDIVIDUAL 95% CI'S FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 
STDEV ---+------- -- + ---------+-- ---- --- +---
4.950 (---------*--------) 
6.386 (---*----) 
O. 000 ( -------------*---------- ---) 
---+---------+---------+---------+---
o 10 20 30 








I!BM. ~ OF strike Packages launched and IfBlIl! BIl.lf.l!B.R of Strike 







AM. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON the ~ of strike Aircraft reaching the 






























INDIVIDUAL 95% CI'S FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 
--------+---------+---------+--------
(---*---) 
(--*--) (----------.----------- ) 
--------+---------+---------+--------
0.30 0.60 0.90 
AN. ANALYSI S OF VARI ANCE ON the ~ of strike Aircraft reaching the 
Target base d on the ~ of strike Packages launched; ~
c o_uni t y. 
SOURCE Df 






0 . 107 4 
0 . 1698 




POOLED STDEV '" 0 . 1)0) 
MS 
0 .10 74 




0 . 031 
I NDIVIDUAL 95% CI'S FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 
STDEV -----+-- ----- - - +---- -----+---------+-
0 . 0349 ( --- - - - ---*- - ------ ) 0 . 181 0 ( _________ w _________ ) 
-----+------ ---+---- --- - - +- - - -- -- --+-
0.72 0 . 8 4 0 . 96 1 . 08 
AD. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON the ~ of Strike Aircraft reaching the 
Target based on the ~ of strike Packages launc hed; NQJ! ~
co_unity. 
SOURCE OF 







POOLED ST DEV .. 
SS 
0 . 1356 
0 . 3966 
0.5 322 
MEAN 
0 . 8750 
0 .7 612 
0 .4286 
0 . 2099 
MS 
0 . 0678 
0 .044 1 
F 
1. 5 4 
p 
0 . 2 6 6 
I NDI VIDUAL 95% e I ' S FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 
STDEV - - +-- ------- +------- --+---- -- - - -+-- - -( --------- *--------- ) 
0.2 13 7 ( ----*--- ) 
0. 00 0 0 ( -------- - - -- *-------------) 
--+--------- f----------+---___ ___ + _ __ _ 
0 . 00 0 . 70 1.05 
AP . ~ o f Strike Aircraft reaching the Targe t based on the ~ of 
Strike Pac kages launched: lk2..tb. co_unitie s. 
"5 
AQ. KEAN ~ of Strike Aircraft reaching the Target based on the 
llJ.u&I2.fu:. of strike Packages launched: .BQth co_unities. 
TAC-AIR Non lAC-AIR 
~of~ P--.tofAlrcnft 
::lim ::i'~ eo - eo ~j2 .. OJ 
., ., 
.. .. 
o 1 2 0 1 2 3 
H ...... of .... ~ HumberfllhttiP.ug. 
AR. ANALYS IS OF VARIANCE OM the ~ of Badger Aircraft lost prior to 
reachi ng their Weapon Release Point based on Warfare Specialty; 1!2.t.h 
co_unities. 
SOURCE DF 












5 . 750 
5.667 
2 . 836 
MS 
0 . 04 








INDIVIDUAL 95% CI'S FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 
-+---------+---------+---------+-----(----------------*--------------- ) (----------------*---------------- ) 
- +---------+---------+---------+-----
4.0 5 . 0 6.0 7.0 
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AS . ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON the ~ of Badger Aircraft lost prior to 
reaching their Weapon Release Point based on .fQu.z:. Infor.a tion Levels; 
.BQth Communities. 
SOURCE OF SS 
Leve l 3 .12 
ERROR 20 173.83 
TOTAL 23 176.96 
LEVEL HEAN 










INDIVIDUAL 95% CPS FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 
STOEV -------+---------+- --------+--- ---- --
2. 639 (----------- *------------) 
2. 066 (-----------*------------) 
4.708 (------------*-------- ---) 
1. 169 (------------*-----------) 
8.0 
AT. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON the Nullber of Badger Aircraft lost prior to 





























INDIV IDUAL 95% e l 'S FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 
STDEV -------+---------... ---------+-- -------
1 .000 (-----------*-----------) 
2 .000 ( -----------*--------- ---) 
5.033 (------------*-----------) 
0. 57 7 (------------*-----------) 
-------+---------+---------+---------
3.0 6.0 9.0 
AU . ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON the Nuaber of Badger Aircraft lost prior to 
reaching the ir Weapon Release Point based on B2!U: Information Levels; 
I!S2N. ~ community. 
SOURCE OF SS 
Level ) 1 0. 7 
ERROR 8 96 .0 
TOTAL 106 . 7 
LEVEL MEAN 
0 5.667 
1 4.3 33 
2 7.000 
) 






INDIVIDUAL 95% CI'S FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 
STOEV - ... ---- -----+---------+---------+-----
4.041 (------------*------------ ) 
1.155 (------------*-------- -----) 
5 .292 (------------*------------) 
1. 52 8 (------------*------------ ) 
-+---------+--- --- - --+- --- -----... -----
0.0 ).5 7 .0 10.5 
MEAN DIFFERENTIAL ANALYSIS OF the ~ of Badger Aircraft lost 
before reaching their Weapon Release Point. 
rtgw,uIJ 
AW. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE on the ~ of Badger Aircraft lost prior to 
reaching their Weapon Release Point based on X!!2 Information Levels; 
~ cOllllllunities. 
SOURCE OF 






















INDIVIDUAL 95 % CI'S FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 
STDEV -+---------+---------+---------+-----2.527 ( ________________ w __ _ ____________ ) 
3. 114 ( ________________ w ________________ ) 
- +---------+---------+---------+-----
4.0 5.0 6.0 7. 0 
AX. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE on the ~ of Badger Aircraft lost prior to 
reaching their Weapon Release Point based on ikQ Information Levels; 
:r.&;'.4.l.B communi ty. 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON BAD Lost 
SOURCE OF SS MS 
Leve l 1 6.7 5 6.75 
ERROR 10 63.50 
















INDI VIDUAL 95% CI'S FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 
-------+---------+---------+---------( __________ w ___________ ) 
( __________ w __________ ) 
-------+---------+---------+---------
4.0 6.0 8.0 
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AY . ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE on the ~ of Badger Ai rcraft lost prior to 
r eaching their Weapon Release Point based on X!tQ. Inforaation Levels; 
f!QIi ~ co_unity. 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON BAD Lost 
SOURCE OF 5S MS 
Level 1 5.3 5 . 3 
ERROR 1 0 101. 3 10 .1 
TOTAL 11 106. 7 
F 
0 . 53 
p 
0 .4 85 
INDIVIDUAL 9 5% CI' S FOR MEAN 







STDEV ----------+-- -------+-------- - ---- - - ---
2.757 (-------------"'------------- ) 
3.559 ( --------------*------------- ) 
----------+---------+---------+------
POOLED STDEV = 3.183 4.0 6 . 0 8.0 
AZ. KEAN DIFFERENTIAL ANALYSI S OF the HUat!e.r: of Badger Aircraft lost 






BA. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON the ~ of Badger Aircraft lost prior to 
Weapon Release Point based on the ~ of CAP Aircraft launched; 
.§Qth communi ties. 
SOURCE OF 55 
CAP Lnch 7 23.74 



















INDIVIDUAL 95% CI'S FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 
STDEV -------+---------+---------+---------
4. 082 (-------*------- -) 
4.04 1 (--------*---------) 
2.217 (--------*-------) 
2.280 (------*------) 
o. 000 (-----------*-----------) 
o. 000 (---------------*---------------) 
3.416 (-------*-------) 
O. 000 (---------------*----------------) 
-------+---------+---------+---------
0.0 4.0 8.0 
BB. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON the ~ of CAP Aircraft launched based on 
Warfare Specialty; J1Qt.l! co_unities. 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON CAP Lnch 
SOURCE OF SS MS 
War Spec 1 0.0 0.0 




















INDIVIDUAL 95% CI' S FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 
-+---------+---------+--- ------+-----(----------------.---------------- ) (----------------*------------- ---- ) 
- +---------+---------+---------+--- - -
11.2 12.8 14.4 16.0 
BC. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON the lfil.IIb§l: of CAP Aircraft launched based on 
~ Information Levels; ~ cOlIIlI.unities. 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON CAP Lnch 
SOURCE OF 5S M5 
Leve l 3 78.5 26.2 
ERROR 20 390.2 19.5 





I NDIVIDUAL 95 % CI'S FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 





POOLED STDEV = 4.417 




10.5 14.0 17.5 
150 
BO. ANALYSI S OF VARIANCE OK the ~ of CAP Aircraft launched based o n 












58 . 9 
198 .0 
2 5 6 .9 
MEAN 
13 . 3) 3 
1 6 . 6 6 7 
10 . 667 
15 .000 





0 . 79 
P 
0 . 531 
IND IVI DUAL 95% C I ' S FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 
STDEV --- - +-- ---- ----+--- --- - - -+ - -- ----- - +--
3. 05 5 ( ----- - - ---*---------- ) ( -------- --*-- - - - ----- ) 
). 05 5 (----------*----------) 
6 . 2 4 5 ( ----------*---------- ) 
----+- ------- - +--- -- - ---+- -------- f- --
6 .0 1 2 . 0 1 8 . 0 2 4. 0 
BE . ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON the ~ of CAP Aircraft launched based on 
~ Information Leve l s; lMJl! 'l'NJ!4E cOllllDunity. 
ANAL YSI S OF VARIANCE ON CAP L n c h 
SOURCE OF SS MS 
Le vel 3 139 .67 4 6 . 56 
ERROR 8 72 . 00 9 .00 




POOLED STDEV = 
8 . 66 7 
1 5 . ))) 
1 8.000 





) .4 64 




0. 0 2 8 
I NDI VI DUAL 95% CI 'S FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 
- +- - - ----- -~--------- + ---------+-----
(-------*-- ----- ) ( ------- *------- ) ( ------- *- - ----- ) 
(-------* ------- ) 
- +- --------+--- - -----+---------+-----
5 . 0 10 . 0 1 5.0 20 . 0 
BF' . ~ of Badger Aircraft destroyed before reaching Weapon Release 
Point based on the Nu.rer of CAP Aircraft launched: 1k2..th cODllll.un i t ies . 
--
:iliidl 
o e 10 12 14 CAP Ie 17 l!O 24 
1 5 1 
BG. MEAN DIFFERENTIAL ANALYSIS OF the ~ of CAP Aircraft launched 
based on 1:mu: Infor.ation Levels: .BQ.t.b: CO:lllluni ties. 
BH. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE on the ~ of CAP Aircraft launched based on 
X!!Q Information Levels. l!!,&h Communities. 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON CAP Lnch 
SOURCE OF MS F 
0.16 
p 
0.693 Level 1 3.4 









INDIVIDUAL 95% CI' S FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 




12.0 14.0 16.0 
BI . ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON the ~ of CAP Aircraft launched based on 


























INDIVIDUAL 95% CI'S FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 
STDEV -------+---------+---------+----- ----
4.858 (------------*------------) (------------*----------- ) 
-------.;.---------+---------+---------
10.5 14.0 17.5 
152 
BJ. AHAL'fSIS OF' VARIANCB ON the ~ of CAP Aircraft launched based on 



















INDIVIDUAL 95% CI'S FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 
STDEV -------+------- --+ - ----- ---+ ________ _ 
4 .561 (---------*----------) 
3 .670 (----------*-------___ ) 
----- --+---------+-------- -+- -- - -----
10.5 14.0 17.5 
BK. KEAN DIFFERENTIAL ANALYSIS ON the ~ of CAP Aircraft launched 
based on fiQ Infor:mation Levels: ~ co_unities. 
SL. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON the ~ of unidentified air and surface 
contacts identified based on Warfare specialty; B2.th: cOllUDllnities. 
OF 


















INDIVIDUAL 95 % CI I S FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 
STDEV ----+--------- -;- ----- ----+---------+--
2.491 (------------ - -- --*-----------------) 
1 .658 (-----------------*-----------------j 
----+-------- - +- --- -- ---+--------- +--
7.70 9 .80 
BM. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON the ~ of unidentified air and surface 
contacts i dentified based on l:2YL: Infor.ation Levels; D2tn 
co_unities. 
SOURCE DF SS 
Level 19.50 














INDIVIDUAL 95% CI'S FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 






6.4 8.0 9.6 11.2 
8N . ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON the ~ of unidentified air and surface 
contacts identified based on 1'Jt.Q Infor..ation Levels; 1!2.t.h co_unities. 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON Ctc ID based on two Information Levels 
SOURCE DF SS MS F P 
Level 1 10.67 10.67 2.67 0.116 













INDIVIDUAL 95% CI'S FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 
---+---------+---------+---------+---(--------*--------- ) (---------*--------- ) 
---+---------+---------+---------+---
7.2 8.4 9.6 10.8 
80. MEAN DIFFERENTIAL ANALYSIS OF the ~ of unknown contacts 
identified: ~ and l"!t2 Inforaation Levels: §Qth co_unities. 
154 
BP. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON player Information Brief relevance. ~ 
communit i es. 
SOURCE OF 55 M5 P 
FACTOR 5 2)8 .00 40.80 O. 000 
ERROR 126 147.00 1.17 
TOTAL 131 )85. 00 
INDIVIDUAL 95% CI 'S FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 
LEVEL N MEAN STDEV ---- - -T---------+---- - ____ + ____ ___ ___ 
Aircraft 22 2 . 182 0 . 958 (---*--- ) 
S AM 22 2 . )6 4 1. 255 (---*-- ) 
Logisti c 22 5. ) 64 0 . 658 (---*-- ) 
OP Comm 22 5 .000 0 .756 (---*-- ) 
Ai r Surv 22 2 . 136 1.0 )7 (---*--- ) 
DefStrat 22 ).955 1.558 (---.--- ) 
- ---- -+---------+---------+---- -- - -- + 
POOLED STOEV ~ 1. 080 2.4 4. B 

















1 2 2.4167 
12 1.9167 




POOLED STDEV = 0.9679 




0 . 000 
INDIVIDUAL 95% CI'S FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 
STDEV - +----------"----- ---- - +------- --+ ____ _ 
0.79)0 ( ---*---) 
0.5774 
1.1146 
1 . ))71 
(---*-- ) 
( --*--- ) 
( - --*-- ) 
( ---*-- j 
(-- *---j 
-+- - ---- - --+---------+---------T-----
1.5 ).0 4. 5 6.0 
BR . ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON player Information Brief relevance. NON TE. 
AIE communit y. 
SOURCE OF 55 
FACTOR 5 98.20 
ERROR 54 
TOTAL 59 175.00 
LEVEL MEAN 
NTA ale 10 1.900 
NTA SAM 10 2 . 900 
NTA LOG 5.200 
NTA COMM 1 0 4. 80 0 
NTA SURV 1 0 2.100 
NTA STAA 4 100 




1) . 81 
p 
0.000 
INDIVIDUAL 95% CI'S FOR MEAN 
BASED ON POOLED STDEV 
STDEV ---+- - -- - - - - - +- - -- - ---- +------- - -+---
1.101 (----*---- j 
1 . )70 ( ----*---- ) 
0.422 ( - - - - * - ---) (----*-- -- ) (----*-- - - ) 
1.85) ( ----*---- ) 
-------------+---------+------ -- - - ---
1.5 ).0 <:.5 6 .0 
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